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THE NEW STATE ZONING: LAND USE 
PREEMPTION AMID A HOUSING CRISIS 
JOHN INFRANCA* 
Abstract: Commentators have long decried the pernicious effects that overly re-
strictive land use regulations, which stifle new development, have on housing 
supply and affordability, regional and national economic growth, social mobility, 
and racial integration. The fragmented nature of zoning rules in the United States, 
which are set primarily at the local level, renders it seemingly impossible to ad-
dress these concerns systematically. Although there have been some efforts to 
address local exclusionary tendencies and their suboptimal effects by means of 
greater state control, these efforts, which remain contentious, have been limited 
to just a few states. In the past few years, a new wave of state interventions in lo-
cal zoning has appeared. These interventions are motivated in part by the harsh 
reality of housing shortages and skyrocketing costs in significant parts of the 
country, which have made housing affordability a salient issue for a broader 
segment of the population. At the same time, states have grown increasingly will-
ing to preempt local governments across a range of policy realms. This Article 
contends that the confluence of these and other factors suggests the potential for 
a recalibration of the balance of power between state and local governments in 
the realms of housing and land use regulation. State governments are increasing-
ly displacing local restrictions on new development, mandating that municipali-
ties permit certain forms of housing, and providing incentives for local govern-
ments to adopt certain forms of housing. I argue that the current housing crisis jus-
tifies bold new forms of state intervention. Such interventions should expressly 
preempt certain narrow elements of local law, rather than, as an earlier generation 
of interventions did, add additional planning requirements, procedural steps, or po-
tential appeals. At the same time, these interventions can, and should, provide clear 
mechanisms for addressing significant countervailing local interests. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Zoning is the quintessential local government power.1 Yet in the past few 
years, affordable housing crises in communities across the country have 
sparked calls for more significant state intervention in land-use decision mak-
ing.2 The most controversial and high profile of these efforts, California’s Sen-
ate Bill 827, would have preempted local land use regulations and effectively 
rezoned significant portions of the state, allowing denser development near 
public transit.3 Senate Bill 827 failed to make it out of committee, but state 
officials in California and elsewhere—from both sides of the aisle—continue 
to seek ways to confront restrictive local zoning that prohibits or slows new 
development, reduces housing supply, and drives up costs.4 
Simultaneously, the seemingly mundane field of land use regulation is 
garnering national attention amid broader recognition of the effects of zoning 
regulations not only on housing supply and affordability, but also on regional 
and national economic growth, social mobility, economic equality, racial inte-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 3 (1990) (“[E]ducation and zoning are the principal operations of local governments.”); 
DANIEL P. SELMI ET AL., LAND USE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 478 (5th ed. 2017) 
(“Land use authority is the most important power remaining at the local level . . . .”). 
 2 See infra notes 58–120 and accompanying text; see also Anika Singh Lemar, The Role of States 
in Liberalizing Land Use Regulations, 97 N.C. L. REV. 293, 294 (2019) (stating that “[f]or the first 
time in decades, there are widespread calls for states to intervene in local land use regulation”). 
 3 See infra notes 140–149 and accompanying text. 
 4 Press Release, Governor Charlie Baker, Baker-Polito Administration Testifies on Housing 
Choice Initiative (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.mass.gov/news/baker-polito-administration-testifies-
on-housing-choice-initiative [https://perma.cc/XF7R-TUUD] (“ [T]here is no way that the State can 
fund enough subsidies to drive the level of housing production that we need to meet demand.”). Cali-
fornia’s Democratic former Governor Jerry Brown, in announcing the 2017 state budget, emphasized 
the high cost of housing development and “made clear he would again support new laws that would 
make it easier to build new homes, lower costs to develop low-income housing and provide financial 
incentives for cities that meet housing production goals.” Liam Dillon, California Governor: We’re 
Not Spending More on Low-income Housing Because It’s Too Expensive to Build, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 
10, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-governor-
we-re-not-spending-more-on-1484082718-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/RDH8-M6H5]. As this 
Article neared publication, California’s newly elected Governor Gavin Newsom was taking signifi-
cantly bolder steps to push local governments to accommodate more new housing. Liam Dillon, At 
Governor Newsom’s Urging, California Will Sue Huntington Beach over Blocked Homebuilding, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-gavin-newsom-huntington-beach-
housing-lawsuit-20190125-story.html https://perma.cc/L29J-45TT]. The state sued the city of Hun-
tington Beach for failing to comply with the state housing law’s requirement that cities set aside a 
certain amount of land for new development. See id. This follows Governor Newsom’s recently pro-
posed budget, which would provide $500 million to cities that show progress towards satisfying short-
term housing goals. CALIF. DEP’T OF FIN., 2019–20 GOVERNOR’S BUDGET: BUSINESS, CONSUMER 
SERVICES, AND HOUSING 85, http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/2019-20/pdf/GovernorsBudget/1000.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2PZC-WX7X]. The budget would also deny transportation funding to cities that fail 
to satisfy longer-term housing quotas. Matt Levin, It’s a Big Deal: Newsom’s Housing Budget Ex-
plained, MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/01/13/its-a-big-deal-
newsoms-housing-budget-explained/ [https://perma.cc/H4XB-7BZS]. 
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gration, and the environment.5 In the waning months of the Obama Admin-
istration, the White House highlighted the national implications of local land 
use regulations, critiquing “[l]ocally-constructed barriers to new housing de-
velopment,” which threaten to exacerbate income inequality and stifle GDP 
growth.6 Current Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Ben Carson 
has similarly spoken of the need to ease restrictions on housing development 
so as to increase supply.7 2020 presidential candidates Cory Booker and Eliza-
beth Warren have proposed measures to address restrictive zoning.8 Focusing 
on one particular barrier to greater housing supply—the significant amount of 
land, including in major cities, zoned to permit only single-family homes—
some critics have gone so far as to declare that the United States has a “single-
family home problem”9 and the nation’s “future depends on the death of the 
single-family home.”10 As one commentator remarked, “[z]oning is having a 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See infra notes 37–42 and accompanying text. 
 6 THE WHITE HOUSE, HOUSING DEVELOPMENT TOOLKIT 1, 2 (2016), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/Housing_Development_Toolkit%20f.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6837-KQF9] (“Local policies acting as barriers to housing supply include land use restrictions that make 
developable land much more costly than it is inherently, zoning restrictions, off-street parking require-
ments, arbitrary or antiquated preservation regulations, residential conversion restrictions, and unneces-
sarily slow permitting processes. The accumulation of these barriers has reduced the ability of many 
housing markets to respond to growing demand.”). 
 7 See Laura Kusisto, HUD to Shift Focus on Fair Housing, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2018, at A4 (quot-
ing Carson declaring: “I want to encourage the development of mixed-income multi-family dwellings all 
over the place.”); see also Kriston Capps, Ben Carson Is a YIMBY Now and Everything’s Confusing, 
CITYLAB (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/08/ben-carsons-new-argument-against-
fair-housing-rules-its-about-nimbys/567449/ [https://perma.cc/BE9S-ZSNP]. The Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (HUD) released an advance notice of proposed rulemaking in August 
2018 requesting comments on potential changes to the agency’s affirmatively furthering fair housing 
regulations. In that notice HUD specifically requested comments on “changes that will . . . seek to 
encourage actions that increase housing choice, including through greater housing supply . . . .” Af-
firmatively Further Fair Housing: Streamlining and Enhancements, 83 Fed. Reg. 40,713 (proposed 
Aug. 16, 2018) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, 903). 
 8 See Madeleine Carlisle, Elizabeth Warren’s Ambitious Fix for America’s Housing Crisis: The 
Massachusetts Democrat Introduced Legislation That Takes Aim at Segregation, Redlining, Restrictive 
Zoning, and the Loss of Equity by Low-Income Homeowners, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2018), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/09/elizabeth-warrens-fix-americas-housing-crisis/571210/ 
[https://perma.cc/DTQ4-EZAF] (explaining the bill that Elizabeth Warren put forward to increase 
federal subsidies for affordable housing and encourage local governments to address zoning re-
strictions); Richard Kahlenberg, Taking on Class and Racial Discrimination in Housing, AM. PRO-
SPECT (Aug. 2, 2018), https://prospect.org/article/taking-on-class-and-racial-discrimination-housing 
[https://perma.cc/WH8L-6E2N] (discussing the legislation brought by Cory Booker that would require 
states, cities, and counties that receive funding under the Community Development Block Grant pro-
gram to develop strategies to reduce barriers to housing development and increase the supply of hous-
ing). 
 9 Conor Dougherty, Getting to Yes on Nimby Street, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2017, at BU1 (asserting 
that high percentage of land area zoned for single-family homes in most American cities makes such 
neighborhoods “an obvious place to tackle the affordable-housing problem”). 
 10 Tanza Loudenback, America’s Future Depends on the Death of the Single-Family Home, BUS. 
INSIDER (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/us-housing-crisis-homeownership-single-
2019] New State Zoning 827 
moment” as individuals across the political spectrum grow increasingly aware 
of the effect of zoning not only on their neighborhoods, but also on their lives 
in general.11 
On the ground, the harsh effects of housing shortages in significant parts 
of the country have given rise to the pro-development Yes in My Back Yard 
(“YIMBY”)12 movement as an antidote to the anti-development tendencies of 
the more familiar Not In My Back Yard (“NIMBY”) phenomenon.13 YIMBY 
advocates played a significant role in recent statewide housing reform efforts 
in California and elsewhere as well as local efforts to ease restrictions on new 
development. 14 YIMBYs frequently invoke the growing consensus among ac-
ademic researchers that restrictive land use regulations have a detrimental ef-
fect on housing supply and affordability.15 In addition to reducing the supply of 
                                                                                                                           
family-home-2017-12 [https://perma.cc/5UHE-5VLN]; see also Owen Pickford, The Path to Elimi-
nating Single-Family Zoning in Seattle, THE URBANIST (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.theurbanist.
org/2017/10/23/the-path-to-eliminate-single-family-zoning-in-seattle/ [https://perma.cc/975T-XDUV] 
(discussing proposals to reduce single-family housing in Seattle). 
 11 Theo Mackey Pollack, Time for a Left-Right Consensus on Zoning Reform, AM. CONSERVA-
TIVE: NEW URBS (Feb. 16, 2018, 12:01AM), https://www.theamericanconservative.com/urbs/time-for-
a-left-right-consensus-on-zoning-reform/ [https://perma.cc/FHK8-6JVQ] (stating that “[b]ad zoning 
laws threaten some of the deepest values of both of our major political traditions, so the circumstances 
are ripe for unusual bedfellows”). At the other end of the political spectrum, Vox’s Matthew Yglesias 
declared California’s SB-827 bill, which would preempt local zoning and allow greater density near 
transit, “one of the most important ideas in American politics today.” Matthew Yglesias, The Myth of 
“Forcing People Out of Their Cars”; It’s About More Options, Not Fewer, VOX (Mar. 19, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/19/17135678/sb-827-cars-california-transit-trains-
buses [https://perma.cc/42T6-BN7T]. 
 12 Jeff Collins, Meet YIMBY: Pro-development Groups Join the Battle in California Housing Wars, 
ORANGE CTY. REG. (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.ocregister.com/2017/09/10/meet-yimby-pro-
development-groups-join-the-battle-in-california-housing-wars/ [https://perma.cc/TG8X-XVUE]; Dennis 
Lynch, The YIMBYs Are Coming: LA’s Pro-development Groups Are Building Momentum, REAL DEAL 
(June 29, 2018), https://therealdeal.com/la/2018/06/29/the-yimbys-are-coming-las-pro-development-
groups-are-building-momentum/ [https://perma.cc/6HNJ-8RJQ]; Erin McCormick, Rise of the Yimbys: 
The Angry Millennials with a Radical Housing Solution, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2017), https://
www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/oct/02/rise-of-the-yimbys-angry-millennials-radical-housing-solution 
[https://perma.cc/U4C8-9Y4E]. See generally Kenneth A. Stahl, “Yes in My Backyard”: Can a New Pro-
housing Movement Overcome the Power of NIMBYs?, 41 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 1 (2018) (discussing 
the pro-housing YIMBY movement). 
 13 NIMBY is typically used pejoratively to refer to existing residents who resist new development 
in their community, typically due to concerns regarding home values or neighborhood character. See 
Kenneth A. Stahl, The Challenge of Inclusion, 89 TEMPLE L. REV. 487, 491 (2017) (noting that 
“NIMBYs are homeowners who vociferously oppose new developments in their communities—
especially affordable housing or any other type of housing—and they have the political clout to get 
their way with local regulatory authorities”). 
 14 See, e.g., Michael Anderson, Housing Advocates in Portland Just Did the Nearly Impossible, 
SIGHTLINE INST. (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.sightline.org/2018/09/17/residential-infill-project-
portland-oregon/ [https://perma.cc/2AP8-YP6J] (noting “in the end (and here’s what was truly unusu-
al) the people [at two public hearings] calling for the city to re-legalize more homes in more varieties 
slightly outnumbered the ones who showed up to defend the status quo—55% to 45%”). 
 15 See infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
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housing statewide, restrictive land use regulations drive up the cost of housing 
production, necessitating even larger state subsidies for affordable housing.16 
This is not the first time that state governments have sought to play a 
more prominent role in regulating land use. In the early 1970s observers sug-
gested that a “quiet revolution” was shifting the locus of land use regulations 
from local to state governments, in part to address issues of statewide con-
cern.17 Although this earlier period gave rise to the three most prominent state 
housing policy interventions—New Jersey’s Mount Laurel doctrine, Massa-
chusetts’s Chapter 40B, and California’s Housing Element Law18—the revolu-
tion never really came to pass and generally speaking, local control and discre-
tion only expanded.19 Efforts at the federal level to confront exclusionary zon-
ing similarly failed.20 
This Article examines a new generation of state interventions in local 
zoning and land use policy, particularly in the realm of housing. These new 
interventions include measures that preempt local laws regarding rent regula-
tion, mandatory inclusionary zoning, and short-term rentals; that displace local 
restrictions on housing development; that provide incentives for municipalities 
to adopt certain forms of zoning; and that mandate that municipalities permit 
the as-of-right development of accessory dwelling units (“ADUs”).21 The ear-
lier generation of state land use interventions focused on channeling local deci-
sions and in some instances allowed appeals to a state entity from adverse local 
                                                                                                                           
 16 Joe Cortright, Why Is “Affordable” Housing So Expensive to Build?, CITY COMMENT. (Oct. 18, 
2017), http://cityobservatory.org/why_affordable_so_expensive/ [https://perma.cc/U6NC-G3FZ]. 
 17 See FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE 
QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED067272.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B6EZ-T6JX]; see also infra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 30–57 and accompanying text. 
 19 SELMI ET AL., supra note 1, at 477 (“Now, many decades later, it is apparent that the funda-
mental change in the governmental level of regulatory control detected in the early 1970s has pro-
ceeded more slowly than anticipated.”). 
 20 See Nolan Gray, When the Federal Government Takes on Local Zoning, CITYLAB (Aug. 20, 
2018), https://www.citylab.com/perspective/2018/08/what-a-bipartisan-push-against-exclusionary-
zoning-looks-like/567901/ [https://perma.cc/2HSL-NJRJ] (discussing an effort in 1991 led by Jack 
Kemp, then-Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under President George H.W. Bush). See 
generally ADVISORY COMM’N ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING, “NOT IN MY 
BACKYARD”: REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING (1991), https://www.huduser.gov/
publications/pdf/notinmybackyard.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8CS-VCAE] (detailing the barriers to creat-
ing affordable housing). 
 21 See infra notes 120–133 and accompanying text. Accessory dwelling units, which are also 
referred to as secondary units, in-law units, and granny flats, are separate self-contained housing units 
located on the property of a single-family home but that cannot be sold separately from the main 
house. They may be built within an existing structure, such as in an attic or basement, or may be phys-
ically separate from the primary dwelling but located on the same lot, such as a backyard cottage or a 
unit above a garage. See generally John Infranca, Housing Changing Households: Regulatory Chang-
es for Micro-Units and Accessory Dwelling Units, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 53 (2014) (discussing 
ADUs in further detail). 
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decisions. In contrast, recent laws and proposed measures tend to expressly 
preempt and displace specific elements of local zoning. 
Although these substantive differences are important, I argue that the social 
context in which these interventions are occurring is equally if not more im-
portant. The breadth and depth of the housing crisis in communities throughout 
the country has made housing affordability a salient issue for a broader swath 
of the population, including young professionals and the businesses that seek 
to employ them.22 At the same time, while an earlier generation of environ-
mental activists focused on slowing new development, younger environmental-
ists are more actively embracing denser urbanized development, particularly 
around public transportation, and challenging local laws that prevent it. Smart 
growth is taking the place of growth management.23 Finally, for better or 
worse, in recent years states are increasingly willing to preempt local govern-
ments across a range of policy realms.24 
The confluence of these and other factors suggests the potential for a re-
calibration of the balance of power between state and local governments in the 
realm of land use regulation. Descriptively, then, my claim is that something 
new is occurring, in terms of the substance of legal reforms, the salience of 
housing affordability concerns, and the public discourse regarding land use 
policy and its broader implications. Collectively these augur a not-so-quiet 
revolution in land use regulation. That descriptive claim leads into three nor-
mative claims. First, the current housing crisis, and the effects of local land use 
policies on housing supply statewide, justify bold new forms of state interven-
tion. Second, such interventions should expressly preempt specific elements of 
local law, rather than add additional planning requirements, procedural steps, 
or potential appeals. Third, these interventions can and should still provide 
mechanisms for addressing significant countervailing local interests. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts.25 Part I briefly reviews justifications for 
local control of land use and articulates a framework for evaluating state inter-
                                                                                                                           
 22 See, e.g., Adam Nagourney & Conor Dougherty, Housing Costs Put California in Crisis Mode, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2017, at A1 (discussing the lack of affordable housing for middle-class families 
in California). 
 23 Admittedly, these terms are amorphous and overlapping, but as I am using them, “smart 
growth” emphasizes streamlining regulations to enable denser development, whereas “growth man-
agement” emphasizes limiting new development. See Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth: The Prom-
ise, Politics, and Potential Pitfalls of Emerging Growth Management Strategies, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 
247, 262 (2000) (stating that “[u]nlike more traditional growth management approaches, smart growth 
targets the governmental regulations that drive sprawl development and revises or streamlines these 
regulations to make it easier to build more compact, mixed use, pedestrian- and transit-friendly pro-
jects”). 
 24 NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CIVIL RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A STATE-BY-STATE 
ANALYSIS 1 (2018), https://www.nlc.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/NLC-SML%20Preemption%20
Report%202017-pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CXL-597B]. 
 25 See infra notes 30–372 and accompanying text. 
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ventions.26 Part II examines the most prominent past examples of state interven-
tions that encourage housing development.27 Part III analyzes a variety of more 
recent interventions, highlighting ways in which these interventions go further 
than earlier efforts in displacing local authority.28 Finally, Part IV compares these 
two generations of laws before arguing that these new state zoning initiatives 
have the potential to better succeed at constraining local exclusionary tenden-
cies, building support for denser development, and increasing housing supply.29 
I. LOCALISM AND LAND USE 
In the seminal 1926 case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., which 
upheld local zoning as a permissible exercise of the police power, the Supreme 
Court of the United States declared apartment houses situated near single-
family homes “a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the 
open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential character of 
the district.”30 In the nearly a century since Euclid, numerous articles in the 
economics31 and legal literature32 have decried the pernicious effects that re-
strictive land use regulations—which prohibit denser development, including 
multi-family apartment buildings—have on housing supply and affordability. 
Nonetheless, such restrictions remain the norm.33 This is true not only in 
wealthy suburban communities—where zoning makes the purchase of a house 
of a particular size or value “a prerequisite for entry into the jurisdiction” and 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See infra notes 30–57 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 58–120 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 121–315 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 316–372 and accompanying text. 
 30 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394, 397 (1926). 
 31 See generally, e.g., Vanessa Brown Calder, Zoning, Land-Use Planning, and Housing Affordabil-
ity, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS, no. 823, Oct. 18, 2017, at 1, 4, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/
files/pubs/pdf/pa-823.pdf [https://perma.cc/859V-HA5P] (discussing empirical research suggesting that 
zoning regulations—including minimum lot size requirements—“reduce supply, which in turn increases 
prices”); Edward L. Glaeser et al., Why Have Housing Prices Gone Up?, 95 AMER. ECON. REV. 329 
(2005); Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Building Restrictions on Housing Afforda-
bility, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV. 21 (2003); Joseph Gyourko et al., A New Measure of the Local Regu-
latory Environment for Housing Markets: The Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index, 45 URB. 
STUD. 693 (2008) (analyzing regulations on housing markets in different U.S. jurisdictions); Andrew D. 
Paciorek, Supply Constraints and Housing Market Dynamics (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion 
Series Working Paper No. 2012-01, 2012), https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2012/201201/
201201pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7N6-5ZWF] (exploring housing market dynamics). 
 32 See generally, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 
101 IOWA L. REV. 91 (2015); Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning 
Budget,” 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 81 (2011). 
 33 Cf. William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its Exclusionary Ef-
fects, 41 URB. STUD. 317, 318 (2004) (discussing the privileged position of single-family owner-
occupied homes in almost every zoning ordinance). 
2019] New State Zoning 831 
access to local public goods, such as better schools.34 Even in urban neighbor-
hoods, residents often stifle housing development and champion zoning that 
severely restricts supply.35 Existing residents fiercely resist both changes to 
zoning that will permit increased density as well as individual developments 
they believe will alter neighborhood character, be out-of-scale with their sur-
roundings, or create competition for street parking over which they assert qua-
si-ownership rights.36 
The result is significantly less housing in desirable metropolitan areas and 
individual neighborhoods than the market would likely otherwise supply. But 
zoning regulations affect more than housing supply and affordability in a par-
ticular community. In recent years scholars have examined the negative effects 
of restrictive land use regulations on a range of issues that cross jurisdictional 
boundaries, such as economic and social mobility,37 racial integration,38 eco-
                                                                                                                           
 34 Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1829 (2003). See gen-
erally Paul Boudreaux, Lotting Large: The Phenomenon of Minimum Lot Size Laws, 68 ME. L. REV. 1 
(2016) (explaining restrictions on minimum lot sizes). 
 35 See John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 92 (2014) 
(“As in the suburbs, cities began to employ land use restrictions to limit the density of housing, im-
pose lengthy approvals processes that provide ample hooks for NIMBYs, and mandate expensive 
forms of housing.”); see also Vicki Been et al., Urban Land-Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Over-
taking the Growth Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 227 (2014) (exploring the power of 
home voters in urban cities). See generally David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670 
(2013) (discussing how laws governing land use decision making constrain efforts to allow more 
development). 
 36 See Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 2—Remedying the Urban Disadvantage 
Through Federalism and Localism, 77 LA. L. REV. 1045, 1068 (2017) (“Although [land use] is often 
considered a ‘traditional’ local concern, the record of local governments using their authority therein 
to exclude ‘undesirable’ uses, like low-income housing, is legion.”); Shelia R. Foster, The Limits of 
Mobility and the Persistence of Urban Inequality, 127 YALE. L.J. F. 481, 485 (2017), https://www.
yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Foster_styrqpy4.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8CU-U9SV] (“Part of the reason for 
such restrictive land policies . . . is the vested interest of existing homeowners who favor policies that 
preserve the status quo and minimize the negative externalities of urban agglomeration, thus maintain-
ing their home values.”). 
 37 See, e.g., David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE 
L.J. 78, 114 (2017) (noting that land use regulations are the best understood limits on mobility); Alana 
Semuels, The Barriers Stopping Poor People from Moving to Better Jobs, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 12, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/geographic-mobility-and-housing/542439/ 
[https://perma.cc/PF47-F2KC]. 
 38 See, e.g., Michael C. Lens & Paavo Monkkonen, Do Strict Land Use Regulations Make Metro-
politan Areas More Segregated by Income?, 82 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 6, 12 (2016) (finding that “partic-
ular types of regulation, such as density restrictions, more independent reviews for project approval 
and zoning changes, and a greater level of involvement by local government and citizenry in the per-
mitting process, are significantly associated with segregation overall and of the affluent, specifically 
when we control for a range of metropolitan areas characteristics”); Jonathan T. Rothwell, Racial 
Enclaves and Density Zoning: The Institutionalized Segregation of Racial Minorities in the United 
States, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 290, 291 (2011) (“Using two datasets of land regulation for the larg-
est metropolitan areas, the results indicate that anti-density regulations are responsible for a large 
share of the observed patterns in segregation between 1990 and 2000.”). See generally RICHARD 
ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED 
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nomic growth39 and equality,40 urban sprawl,41 and a variety of environmental 
concerns.42 
Confronting these challenges systematically has long been rendered diffi-
cult by the fragmented nature of land use policy and zoning regulations in the 
United States, which are set primarily at the local level.43 The extent of local 
                                                                                                                           
AMERICA (2017) (examining the role of land use regulations, among other government policies, in 
establishing and exacerbating segregation). 
 39 See, e.g., Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21154, 2015) (finding land use restrictions that 
reduce new housing supply lowered aggregate U.S. economic growth by more than fifty percent between 
1964 and 2009); see also Space and the City, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 4, 2015), https://www.economist.
com/leaders/2015/04/04/space-and-the-city [https://perma.cc/XR6G-24M2] (noting that “[l]ifting all the 
barriers to urban growth in America could raise the country’s GDP by between 6.5% and 13.5%, or by 
about $1–2 trillion. It is difficult to think of many other policies that would yield anything like that”). See 
generally Wendell Pritchett & Shitong Qiao, Exclusionary Megacities, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 467 (2018). 
 40 See Schleicher, supra note 37, at 115 (stating that “[b]ecause these restrictions raise the cost of 
housing, they disproportionately prevent poor and working-class people from taking advantage of 
high-wage job markets”). 
 41 See William A. Fischel, The Evolution of Homeownership, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1503, 1516 
(2010) (arguing that restrictive zoning “probably encourages metropolitan-area sprawl”); R. Pendall, 
Do Land-Use Controls Cause Sprawl?, 26 ENV’T & PLAN. B: PLAN. & DESIGN 555, 555 (1999) (find-
ing land use regulations that mandate low densities lead to increased sprawl). 
 42 See Edward Glaeser, Reforming Land Use Regulations, BROOKINGS INST. 1, 5–6 (Apr. 24, 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/reforming-land-use-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/3853-HK9R] 
(arguing that—because “[c]arbon emissions per household are lower in coastal California than elsewhere 
in the country”—regulations that prevent development simply push it elsewhere, leading to increased 
carbon emissions). See generally Reid Ewing & Robert Cervero, Travel and the Built Environment, 76 J. 
AM. PLAN. ASS’N 265 (2010) (reviewing the literature regarding the environmental effects of denser 
development on automobile emissions and residential energy usage). There has recently been some de-
bate over the lessons to be drawn from these studies. Compare Mark R. Stevens, Does Compact Devel-
opment Make People Drive Less?, 83 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 7, 7 (2017) (finding that compact development 
does cause people to drive less, but impact is relatively small), with Reid Ewing & Robert Cervero, 
“Does Compact Development Make People Drive Less?” The Answer Is Yes, 83 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 19, 
20 (2017) (disputing results and conclusions in Stevens’ article). See generally Hossein Estiri, Differ-
ences in Residential Energy Use Between US City and Suburban Households, 50 REGIONAL STUD. 1919 
(2016) (discussing analyses of household energy consumption indicating that the average suburban resi-
dences consume more energy than urban households); Reid Ewing & Fang Rong, The Impact of Urban 
Form on U.S. Residential Energy Use, 19 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 1 (2008) (finding lower residential 
energy use among residents of more compact counties relative to otherwise comparable residents of 
sprawling counties). In addition, studies have shown the threat sprawl causes for wildlife habitats and 
water quality. See REID EWING & JOHN KOSTYACK, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, ENDANGERED BY 
SPRAWL: HOW RUNAWAY DEVELOPMENT THREATENS AMERICA’S WILDLIFE, at vi–vii (2005), 
https://www.nwf.org/~/media/PDFs/Wildlife/EndangeredbySprawl.pdf [https://perma.cc/3266-AGS6]; 
John S. Jacob & Ricardo Lopez, Is Denser Greener? An Evaluation of Higher Density Development as 
an Urban Stormwater-Quality Best Management Practice, 45 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 687, 
688 (2009) (finding that higher density development might be best method for mitigating water quality 
damage attributable to increased development). 
 43 Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation, and 
the States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 233 (2008) (“Currently, much of what can be called traditional land 
use regulation—zoning ordinances and design controls, but not environmental management, building 
code, endangered species, or housing laws—occurs at the local level.”). 
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control over land use regulation in the United States is quite unique in compar-
ison with other nations.44 This generates some potential benefits. The distribu-
tion of regulatory authority across multiple local jurisdictions enables individ-
uals, as Charles Tiebout famously articulated, to sort themselves based on 
preferences for a particular package of taxation, regulation, and amenities as 
localities compete for residents.45 But those individuals are then motivated to 
use land use regulations to restrict entry into the community so that those who 
desire better services, such as schools, but cannot pay the full cost of their 
share of those goods are prevented from obtaining them at a reduced rate by 
buying smaller units of housing in these desirable neighborhoods.46 
Accordingly, while interjurisdictional competition may produce certain 
efficiency gains, by allowing (some) individuals to sort based on their prefer-
ences, it also enables local governments to impose exclusionary land use poli-
cies, which can exacerbate inequalities across a metropolitan region.47 As Wil-
liam Fischel’s influential “homevoter hypothesis” posits, “homeowners, who 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See generally SONIA HIRT, ZONED IN THE USA: THE ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF AMERI-
CAN-USE REGULATION (2014) (discussing land use regulations in the United States). Tokyo provides 
a particularly dramatic example of minimal local control and largely national decision making on city 
planning and building law. See Robin Harding, Why Tokyo Is the Land of Rising Home Construction 
but Not Prices, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/023562e2-54a6-11e6-befd-
2fc0c26b3c60 [https://perma.cc/JAU2-5WZX]. Although this has its costs in terms of design and open 
space, among other things, the pace of development has contributed to significantly smaller increases 
in price. Id. (“Here is a startling fact: in 2014 there were 142,417 housing starts in the city of Tokyo 
(population 13.3m, no empty land), more than the 83,657 housing permits issued in the state of Cali-
fornia (population 38.7m), or the 137,010 houses started in the entire country of England (population 
54.3m).”). 
 45 See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 
(1956) (discussing that general thesis). 
 46 Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 624 (2002) (citing Bruce W. Hamilton, 
Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205 (1975)); see 
also Schragger, supra note 34, at 1828 (“So-called ‘fiscal zoning’—minimum acreage requirements, 
minimum square footage requirements, and outright limitations on multi-family housing—is a com-
mon (and much condemned) suburban strategy to limit development and ensure that newcomers pur-
chase a minimum level of housing.”); Stahl, supra note 13, at 497 (“[M]any communities seek not 
only to limit the number of residents but also to ensure that homes are sufficiently expensive so that 
poor people (defined as anyone poorer than existing residents) cannot afford to live there.”). This is 
not simply a recent phenomenon. See HIRT, supra note 44, at 110–11 (discussing how desire “to pro-
tect the housing enclaves of the elite from invasion by working-class and poor people, including racial 
and ethnic minorities” was often cited explicitly as justification for zoning in early 1900s). 
 47 Nicole Stelle Garnett, Unbundling Homeownership: Regional Reforms from the Inside Out, 
119 YALE L.J. 1904, 1907, 1922 (2010) (“[T]here is no question that regulatory barriers to entry into 
the suburbs are a primary cause of interjurisdictional inequality within our metropolitan regions 
. . . .”); see also Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, 2016 BYU L. REV. 
177, 183 (“The ability of local governments to regulate land use without regard to extraterritorial 
impacts encourages municipalities to act in narrowly self-interested ways and often prevents them 
from cooperating to address global concerns.”); Luther L. McDougal III, Contemporary Authoritative 
Conceptions of Federalism and Exclusionary Land Use Planning: A Critique, 21 B.C. L. REV. 301, 
305–07 (1980) (discussing the social and economic impacts of exclusionary zoning). 
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are the most numerous and politically influential group within most localities, 
are guided by their concern for the value of their homes” when making deci-
sions about matters including local zoning.48 Given this paramount concern 
and the potentially adverse effects of new development, “[a] nation of home-
owners is likely to be a nation of NIMBYs, and their anxieties are likely to be 
manifest[ed] in zoning laws.”49 
Commentators have long debated the ideal vertical allocation of power 
between state and local governments.50 Local government autonomy, it is ar-
gued, facilitates democratic participation51 and the satisfaction of local prefer-
ences.52 But it can also lead to significant inefficiencies, in the form of exter-
nalities that spread beyond a particular jurisdiction’s boundaries, as well as 
exclusionary policies that disadvantage particular groups.53 In an essay, Nestor 
Davidson argues that a state’s normative commitments should inform the allo-
cation of power between state and local governments. Davidson identifies “the 
individual-rights provisions of state constitutions and the general-welfare con-
straint operative when the state delegates its plenary power to a geographically 
bounded local government” as potential sources for these normative commit-
ments.54 The latter is a particularly vital source in the context of land use regu-
lation. On Davidson’s account, consideration of the general welfare of the state 
provides a mechanism “for limiting the most pernicious externalities” and set-
ting boundaries on local power.55 
Restrictive local land use regulations that reduce housing supply can gen-
erate significant externalities that are detrimental to the welfare of states, re-
gions, and the nation. States have referenced these effects in justifying inter-
                                                                                                                           
 48 WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LO-
CAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 4 (2001). 
 49 Id. at 232; see also Fennell, supra note 46, at 624 (“[T]he fact remains that zoning laws typical-
ly enable homeowners to mitigate . . . home-investment risks rather successfully by giving them pow-
er to behave as NIMBYs.”). 
 50 See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LO-
CAL GOVERNMENT LAW 16–51 (7th ed. 2009) (assembling material on the “vertical distribution of 
power question” from the founding period to the present). 
 51 See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1072–73 
(1980) (discussing potential of cities as source of participatory democracy). 
 52 See, e.g., Tiebout, supra note 45. 
 53 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1124–36 (1996) (examining arguments for efficiency of local governance and 
potential exclusionary consequences). Focusing on regional governance, Briffault argues that the 
“optimal metropolitan area government” should possess “authority to adopt regional land use plans 
that will bind future land development throughout the region and the power to displace local land use 
actions that have regional significance.” Id. at 1166. 
 54 Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 YALE L.J. 954, 
986 (2019). 
 55 Id.at 992. 
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ventions in local land use policy.56 At the same time, there are reasons why 
zoning remains a traditional local government power. 
Zoning determines what can be done with specific parcels of land within 
the boundaries of particular jurisdictions or neighborhoods. It allows local res-
idents to shape the community in which they live. Restrictive zoning across 
multiple jurisdictions may reduce housing supply and exacerbate costs 
statewide, but new development can generate heavily localized externalities. 
Although in many cases the fears of neighbors are exaggerated, a large multi-
family apartment building may produce more traffic, more pressure on often 
inadequate and underfunded local infrastructure, and more shadows on neigh-
boring parcels. Local residents often possess greater awareness of and sensitiv-
ity to these distinctly local concerns.57 
Given these tensions, when should states intervene and what form should 
these interventions take? One way to evaluate potential state interventions 
would be to consider how well they further a set of identifiable goals, such as 
increasing housing supply and affordability. However, focusing solely on a 
particular empirical question—to the extent the effects of a specific interven-
tion can be adequately isolated and measured—poses the risk of ignoring 
countervailing interests, including the value of enabling the exercise of local 
power over those distinctly local concerns that do exist. As such, the existence 
of extra-jurisdictional externalities does not necessarily lead to the conclusion 
that states rather than local governments should control all aspects of land use 
regulation that generate such externalities. 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See, e.g., A.B. 2923, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018), http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/
faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB2923 [https://perma.cc/8W7C-H34V]. A.B. 2923 states 
in its findings: 
The state’s economic health is significantly tied to the regional economic health of the 
San Francisco Bay Area. The growth and success of the Bay Area’s economy is threat-
ened by several challenges, including inadequate and unaffordable housing and exces-
sive and increasing roadway congestion. In the state-mandated sustainable communities 
strategy for the Bay Area, locating affordable and market-rate housing near high-
capacity transit is a primary tool with which to address these challenges and will keep 
the Bay Area on track to meet its state-mandated greenhouse gas emissions reduction 
targets. 
Id. 
 57 See Eric T. Freyfogle, The Particulars of Owning, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 574, 580 (1999) (“Sensi-
ble land use decisions require knowledge of the land itself, in its many variations . . . . Local people 
typically know the land better than outsiders. For land planning to prove successful, their knowledge 
is needed just as much as their cooperation.”); see also Bronin, supra note 43, at 238 (stating that 
“[s]cholars have argued that localities should have sole decision-making powers over land use because 
local individuals understand the unique characteristics of their land better than outsiders do and can 
therefore make fairer or more competent decisions. By the same logic, outsiders lack an understanding 
of how decisions about land use could impact the aesthetic character, property values, and demograph-
ic makeup of the local community”). 
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The current housing crisis, its broader implications, and the systemic fac-
tors that render local governments incapable (or unwilling) to address it justify 
aggressive forms of state intervention in local land use regulation. The ques-
tion then becomes whether and how local concerns can still be addressed and 
what weight these concerns should be given. With these considerations in 
mind, the next two Parts evaluate state interventions with particular attention 
to how they allocate authority between the state and local government. Alt-
hough increasing housing supply is clearly an interest of statewide importance, 
such interventions can and should provide a mechanism for consideration of 
legitimate countervailing local concerns. 
II. THE FIRST GENERATION OF STATE LAND USE INTERVENTIONS 
Local control of zoning is the historical norm in the United States, but in 
the early 1970s observers perceived a shift towards a more prominent state 
role. Most notably, a 1971 report entitled The Quiet Revolution in Land Use 
Control studied how states were exercising their regulatory authority to ad-
dress a range of complex land use issues that had state-wide or regional ef-
fects.58 While recognizing that “[s]tates were attempting to address truly 
statewide and regional issues rather than merely create another layer of land 
development control,” the authors concluded that this effort ultimately resulted 
in significant duplication and an explosion in the number of required permits.59 
In fact, the 1970s marks the time when zoning regulations became increasingly 
restrictive, resulting in “a sharp break with the past.”60 
In a follow up article, The Quiet Revolution Revisited: A Quarter Century 
of Progress, David Callies remarked that in the more than two decades since its 
publication “[l]ocal zoning has not withered away (nor did we anticipate that it 
would)” and that “[t]here has been precious little permit simplification.”61 Sara 
Bronin put the point more bluntly, noting that in the last few decades local con-
trol and discretion has only expanded, including in the area of environmental 
                                                                                                                           
 58 See generally BOSSELMAN & CALLIES, supra note 17. The report’s nine case studies of state 
land use laws focused on environmental concerns, but it includes the Massachusetts Zoning Appeals 
Law. See id. at 164–86. 
 59 David L. Callies, The Quiet Revolution Revisited: A Quarter Century of Progress, 26 URB. L. 
197, 197–98 (1994). 
 60 William A. Fischel, The Rise of the Homevoters: How the Growth Machine Was Subverted by 
OPEC and Earth Day, in EVIDENCE AND INNOVATION IN HOUSING POLICY 13, 13 (Lee Anne Fennell 
& Benjamin J. Keys eds., 2017); see also HOUSING DEVELOPMENT TOOLKIT, supra note 6, at 5 
(“Over the past three decades, local barriers to housing development have intensified, particularly in 
the high-growth metropolitan areas increasingly fueling the national economy.”). 
 61 Callies, supra note 59, at 197. 
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protection specifically, and “the quiet revolution failed to materialize.”62 This 
failure is not surprising, given the history of deference to local control over 
zoning as well as the perception that local governments are better able to give 
voice to local expertise regarding the appropriate use of a particular parcel of 
land.63 In the housing realm, a normative commitment to local control is often 
reinforced by opposition on the ground from homeowners resistant to greater 
density, more lower-income families, or a sense that state politicians are ena-
bling greedy developers to ride roughshod over local resident taxpayers. 
Nonetheless, three prominent state-level efforts to push local communities 
to permit more new housing, particularly affordable and multi-family housing, 
developed during the 1970s and remain in effect: Massachusetts’s Chapter 
40B,64 New Jersey’s Mount Laurel doctrine,65 and California’s Housing Ele-
ment Law.66 Understanding these earlier efforts, and the methods by which 
they reshaped the allocation of zoning authority between state and local gov-
ernments, will inform our evaluation of more recent interventions. 
A. Massachusetts: A Focus on Streamlining Development  
Approvals and Encouraging Zoning Reform 
Passed into law in 1972, the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit Act 
streamlines the approval process for affordable housing developments in the 
Commonwealth.67 Chapter 40B allows developers to apply for a “comprehen-
sive permit” from a local Zoning Board of Appeals (“ZBA”) to build a new 
development that contains a certain percentage of affordable units.68 The com-
prehensive permit process enables the local ZBA to waive certain land use 
regulations and coordinate the various permits required for a development, 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See Bronin, supra note 43 at 232; see also SELMI ET AL., supra note 1, at 477 (stating that 
“[n]ow, many decades later, it is apparent that the fundamental change in the governmental level of 
regulatory control detected in the early 1970s has proceeded more slowly than anticipated”). 
 63 SELMI ET AL., supra note 1, at 478 (“One powerful reason [for resistance to shifting control of 
land use to higher level of argument] is the pervasive conviction that, because land use decisions have 
an important impact on living conditions in local communities, those elected representatives who are 
closes to the community should decide them.”). 
 64 See infra notes 67–78 and accompanying text. 
 65 See infra notes 79–95 and accompanying text. 
 66 See infra notes 96–116 and accompanying text. 
 67 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B (2016); see Carolina K. Reid et al., Addressing California’s Hous-
ing Shortage: Lessons from Massachusetts Chapter 40B, 25 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY 
DEV. L. 241, 245 (2017). The Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit Act is often referred to as “Chap-
ter 40B” after its provision of the Massachusetts General Laws. 
 68 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 21. To qualify for a comprehensive permit, a proposed rental 
development must ensure that at least 20% of units are affordable to households earning under 50% of 
the area median income (“AMI”), and a development of ownership units must have at least 25% of 
units at prices affordable to households earning under 80% of the AMI. Reid et al., supra note 67, at 
248, 265 nn.115–16. 
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avoiding the need for a developer to go before multiple boards.69 A developer 
whose permit is denied can appeal the local ZBA’s decision to a state-level 
Housing Appeals Committee (“HAC”).70 In communities where at least ten 
percent of housing units are affordable to low- and moderate-income house-
holds, the local ZBA’s decision will not be overturned.71 In other communities, 
the state HAC may overturn a local ZBA decision and grant a comprehensive 
permit upon a finding that the regional need for housing is not outweighed by 
local concerns.72 
Although Chapter 40B institutes a streamlined development approval 
process, the review of a proposed development occurs in the first instance at 
the local level. The threat of state intervention in local zoning (via the HAC) 
serves in part to motivate local zoning changes. Even when the HAC does in-
tervene, it will grant a comprehensive permit only upon a showing that local 
concerns do not outweigh the regional need for housing. In these ways, Chap-
ter 40B channels, rather than displaces, local decision making.73 
Chapter 40B has been relatively successful in increasing the number of 
communities in which more than ten percent of housing is affordable to low- 
and moderate-income households by increasing it from only 4 of Massachu-
setts’s 351 cities and towns in 1972 to 40 in 2012 74 and 44 in 2014.75 The Act 
is credited with producing 70,000 housing units, 35,000 of which are low- to 
moderate-income.76 
                                                                                                                           
 69 Rachel G. Bratt & Abigail Vladeck, Addressing Restrictive Zoning for Affordable Housing: 
Experiences in Four States, 24 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 594, 600 (2014). 
 70 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 22. 
 71 Id. § 20 (“Requirements or regulations shall be consistent with local needs when imposed by a 
board of zoning appeals after comprehensive hearing in a city or town where (1) low or moderate 
income housing exists which is in excess of ten per cent of the housing units reported in the latest 
federal decennial census of the city or town or on sites comprising one and one half per cent or more 
of the total land area zoned for residential, commercial or industrial use.”); 760 MASS. CODE REGS. 
56.07(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2018) (“In any case, the Board may show conclusively that its decision was 
Consistent with Local Needs by proving that one or more of the grounds described in 760 CMR 
56.03(1) has been satisfied . . . .”). 
 72 Bratt & Vladeck, supra note 69, at 600. 
 73 Cf. Michael C. Pollack, Land Use Federalism’s False Choice, 68 ALA. L. REV. 707, 712 
(2017) (examining federal interventions in land use decision making). Pollack distinguishes between 
“decision-channeling constraints that require localities to take certain deliberative steps before making 
certain decisions, [and] . . . decision-displacing rules that limit the set of decisions localities may 
make in the first place.” Id. 
 74 Reid et al., supra note 67, at 251. 
 75 CITIZENS’ HOUSING & PLAN. ASS’N, CHAPTER 40B: THE STATE’S AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
LAW 1 (2014), https://www.chapa.org/sites/default/files/40%20B%20fact%20sheet_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/AW2A-A92N]. 
 76 MassHousing Planning and Programs Department, MASSHOUSING, https://www.masshousing.
com/portal/server.pt/community/planning_programs/207/masshousing%27s_planning_programs_depart-
ment [https://perma.cc/HRN4-P6ZP]. Low- to moderate-income is considered households that make 
less than eighty percent of the area median income. See id. 
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Although Chapter 40B is the most famous zoning override or “antisnob 
zoning” legislation, six other states have procedures through which either an 
administrative agency or the judiciary can review a local land use decision in-
volving an affordable housing proposal.77 Although these processes vary, in 
each of these states the burden of proof is shifted to local governments, which 
must “establish valid reasons for rejecting or restricting such proposals.”78 
B. New Jersey: A Focus on Planning and Development Approvals 
Starting in 1975 the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided a series of 
cases that have collectively framed what is known as the Mount Laurel doc-
trine.79 The first decision, Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount 
Laurel Township (“Mount Laurel I”), required municipalities to take steps, 
through their land use regulations, to make the development of low- and mod-
erate-income housing “realistically possible . . . at least to the extent of the 
municipality’s fair share of the present and prospective regional need[s].”80 
The court’s decision emphasized that zoning regulations, as an exercise of the 
police power, must further the general welfare.81 Because the zoning power is 
delegated by the state to local authorities, it remains subject to the same re-
strictions that bind the state.82 As such, “when regulation does have a substan-
                                                                                                                           
 77 Peter Salsich, State and Local Regulation Promoting Affordable Housing, in THE LEGAL 
GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 83, 89 (Tim Iglesias & Rochelle E. Lento eds., 
2011) (discussing procedures for land use decision making in Illinois, New Jersey, Rhode Island, 
California, Connecticut, and New Hampshire). 
 78 Id. The Rhode Island Low and Moderate Income Housing Act of 1991 is similar to Chapter 
40B in many respects, including setting a goal of having ten percent of the total housing in each mu-
nicipality affordable to low- and moderate-income households, establishing a comprehensive permit 
process, and creating a State Housing Appeals Board. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 45-53-1 to -9 (Supp. 
2018). Connecticut and Illinois also have an appeals process similar to Massachusetts and an afforda-
ble housing goal for each municipality, set as a percentage of the overall housing stock. Affordable 
Housing Land Use Appeals Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30G (2013); Illinois Housing Planning and 
Appeal Act, 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. 67/1-50 (Supp. 2003). See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF HOME 
BUILDERS, STATE SURVEY OF HOUSING APPEALS STATUTES 1, 18 (2017), http://www.hbact.org/
resources/Documents/GA-Legislative%20Affairs/state-survey-of-housing-appeals-statutes-201706.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4JPU-U78V ] (discussing process in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut and 
Illinois, as well as California’s Housing Accountability Act, “which does not provide for an independ-
ent appeals process”). 
 79 See John M. Payne, Fairly Sharing Affordable Housing Obligations: The Mount Laurel Matrix, 
22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 365, 365 (2001) (describing the Mount Laurel doctrine as “probably the best 
known affordable-housing initiative of our time, and without a doubt the most ambitious judicial rul-
ing in the field of land use controls since World War II”). For a detailed description of the initial 
Mount Laurel litigation, see Briffault, supra note 1, 48–56. 
 80 S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Twp. (“Mount Laurel I”), 336 A.2d 713, 724 (N.J. 
1975). 
 81 Id. at 725 (“Conversely, a zoning enactment which is contrary to the general welfare is inva-
lid.”). 
 82 Id. at 726. 
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tial external impact, the welfare of the state’s citizens beyond the borders of the 
particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must be recognized and 
served.”83 Although Mount Laurel I was focused on low- and moderate-income 
housing, given the effects of restrictive zoning on the supply of housing af-
fordable at all income levels, the same assessment of the external effects of 
certain zoning regulations on the general welfare of the state should apply.84 
In a subsequent decision eight years later, in Southern Burlington County 
N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Township (“Mount Laurel II”),85 the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey recognized a “builder’s remedy,” which enabled develop-
ers to build “at a higher density than would otherwise be provided so long as 
the builder also provided a portion of affordable housing in its construction.”86 
Once again the court emphasized the external effects of zoning on the general 
welfare, albeit this time, the court focused on the general welfare on a regional 
level rather than the state level.87 
Following these decisions, in 1985, the New Jersey Legislature enacted 
the Fair Housing Act, which established the Council on Affordable Housing 
(“COAH”) and purported to codify the mandates of Mount Laurel I & II.88 
COAH was tasked with enforcing the municipal fair-share guidelines and was 
                                                                                                                           
 83 Id. (emphasis added); see also Davidson, supra note 54 (discussing Mount Laurel I). 
 84 Although it focuses on the variety of housing available and on low- and moderate-income spe-
cifically, passages in Mount Laurel I might be read as an implicit critique of broader restrictions on 
housing supply. Consider, for instance: 
It is plain beyond dispute that proper provision for adequate housing of all categories of 
people is certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare required in 
all local land use regulation. Further the universal and constant need for such housing is 
so important and of such broad public interest that the general welfare which develop-
ing municipalities like Mount Laurel must consider extends beyond their boundaries 
and cannot be parochially confined to the claimed good of the particular municipality. 
Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 727–28 (emphasis added). 
 85 S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Twp. (“Mount Laurel II”), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 
1983). 
 86 Daniel Meyler, Is Growth Share Working for New Jersey?, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
219, 227 (2010). In order for developers to build, the builders would first have to establish that the 
municipality’s zoning was exclusionary. See id. 
 87 Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 415 (emphasizing that “[w]hen the exercise of [the police] power 
by a municipality affects something as fundamental as housing, the general welfare includes more 
than the welfare of that municipality and its citizens: it also includes the general welfare—in this case 
the housing needs—of those residing outside of the municipality but within the region that contributes 
to the housing demand within the municipality”). A state court in New York has similarly assessed 
local zoning in relation to its regional effects. See In re Cty. of Monroe, 530 N.E.2d 202, 203–04 
(N.Y. 1988) (noting that a county may challenge a municipality’s restrictive zoning on grounds that 
county’s public interest in proceeding with development outweighs municipality’s interest in restrict-
ing such development); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242–43 (N.Y. 1975) (stating 
that any party that owns or controls land may challenge municipality’s restrictive zoning on grounds 
that such zoning does not take sufficient account of regional housing needs for multi-family housing). 
 88 See Robert C. Holmes, The Clash of Home Rule and Affordable Housing: The Mount Laurel 
Story Continues, 12 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 325, 349–50 (2013). 
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responsible for allocating affordable housing obligations among the state’s 
municipalities every six years.89 Localities that completed a voluntary housing 
element and a fair share plan could petition COAH for certification of the plan, 
which if granted, rendered a municipality’s housing element and ordinances 
presumptively valid in any exclusionary zoning litigation for a finite period.90 
Critics argued that COAH still granted “inappropriate deference to local dis-
cretion and control.”91 Frustrated by COAH’s failure to enforce the obligations 
of local governments under the Mount Laurel doctrine, the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey recently held that it would enforce those obligations itself.92 
Mount Laurel emphasizes local planning more than Chapter 40B.93 The 
requirement that municipalities take steps to plan and zone in a way that pro-
vides for their respective “fair share” of affordable housing arguably requires 
local governments to take more proactive steps than are required in Massachu-
setts. More than 60,000 new affordable units had been built and nearly 15,000 
rehabilitated in New Jersey as of 2011 due to Mount Laurel.94 Nonetheless, 
housing prices in New Jersey generally remain high, which some attribute in 
part to communities imposing growth control measures and resisting any new 
development in the face of Mount Laurel.95 
C. California: A Focus on Planning and Procedure 
Nine of the ten least affordable large metro areas and eight of the ten least 
affordable small metro areas (with populations under 500,000) are in Califor-
                                                                                                                           
 89 Id. at 354. 
 90 In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97 N.J. Council on Affordable Hous., 110 A.3d 31, 35 (N.J. 
2015). A housing element is a required part of each municipality’s master plan and specifies plans for 
housing development sufficient to meet current and expected needs. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-310 
(West 2010). A fair share plan provides a “realistic opportunity” for the development of low- and moder-
ate-income housing within a municipality. See About the Council, N.J. DEP’T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, 
https://www.state.nj.us/dca/affiliates/coah/about/ [https://perma.cc/238F-PY5K]. 
 91 Holmes, supra note 88, at 350. 
 92 See In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 110 A.3d at 42 (“[T]he administrative forum is not 
capable of functioning as intended by the FHA due to the lack of lawful Third Round Rules assigning 
constitutional obligations to municipalities . . . . Accordingly, we conclude that towns must subject 
themselves to judicial review for constitutional compliance, as was the case before the FHA was en-
acted.”). 
 93 Massachusetts recently provided a mechanism through which municipalities with an approved 
“housing production plan” can be shielded from appeals to the HAC, but few jurisdictions have ob-
tained such approval and comprehensive planning more generally receives little emphasis in Massa-
chusetts. See Chapter 40 B Housing Production Plan, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/service-
details/chapter-40-b-housing-production-plan [https://perma.cc/SJY7-GLQA]. 
 94 See PROPOSED AND COMPLETED AFFORDABLE UNITS, N.J. DEP’T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, http://
www.nj.gov/dca/services/lps/hss/transinfo/reports/units.pdf [https://perma.cc/92JN-7CZY]. 
 95 WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES! THE ECONOMICS OF LAND USE REGULATION 361 
(2015); see infra notes 316–320 and accompanying text. 
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nia.96 Unaffordable housing persists throughout the state, even outside coastal 
urban areas.97 A 2015 report by the state’s Legislative Analyst’s Office noted 
that a lack of supply has helped drive up housing costs, causing problems for 
individual households and the state’s economy.98 This is not the first time con-
cerns regarding housing supply and affordability have received statewide at-
tention in California. In 1980, the California State Legislature declared “[t]he 
availability of housing” an issue of “vital statewide importance”99 and required 
localities to adopt “a comprehensive, long term general plan,” which included 
a “housing element,” a specific plan for meeting local housing needs.100 The 
housing-element requirement was first introduced in 1969, but the 1980 law 
strengthened the earlier version and required that local housing elements be 
updated every five years.101 
Under current California law, a municipality’s “housing element” must 
include “[a]n assessment of housing needs and an inventory of resources and 
constraints . . . .”102 It must include a specified analysis of population and em-
ployment trends, land prices, construction costs, the availability of financing, 
and constraints, including zoning, on the development of housing at all income 
levels.103 Additionally, local governments must provide an inventory of suita-
ble land for residential development and “[a] statement of the community’s 
goals, quantified objectives, and policies relative to the maintenance, preserva-
tion, improvement, and development of housing” as well as a timeline for tak-
ing specific actions to implement the localities’ policies and achieve its goals 
                                                                                                                           
 96 John McManus, 9 of 10 of US’s Least Affordable Housing [Large] Markets Are California’s 
Metros, BUILDER (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.builderonline.com/building/regulation-policy/9-of-10-
of-uss-least-affordable-housing-large-markets-are-california-metros_o [https://perma.cc/VSP8-WPJH]. 
 97 See Sara Kimberlin, Californians in All Parts of the State Pay More Than They Can Afford for 
Housing, CAL. BUDGET & POL’Y CTR. (2017), https://calbudgetcenter.org/resources/californians-parts-
state-pay-can-afford-housing/ [https://perma.cc/PS9K-TCCH] (explaining that “while housing costs vary 
across California, housing affordability is clearly a problem throughout the state when housing costs are 
compared to incomes”); see also Matt Levin, How Sky-high Housing Costs Make California the Poorest 
State, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/How-sky-high-housing-
costs-make-California-the-12244924.php [https://perma.cc/9B84-4SNQ] (“When the cost of living is 
factored in, the Golden State has the highest poverty rate in the country.”). 
 98 MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, CALIFORNIA’S HIGH HOUSING COSTS: 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1, 3 (2015), http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2015/finance/housing-costs/
housing-costs.pdf [https://perma.cc/TH85-5ZX7]. 
 99 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65580 (West 2018). 
 100 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 779 (4th ed. 
2013) (quoting CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65300 (2013)). 
 101 PAUL G. LEWIS, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., CALIFORNIA’S HOUSING ELEMENT LAW: THE 
ISSUE OF LOCAL NONCOMPLIANCE 11, 16 (2003). Other states that require a housing element in local 
comprehensive plans include Vermont, Illinois, Nebraska, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Florida, Arizona, 
and Maine. See Ngai Pindell, Planning for Housing Requirements, in THE LEGAL GUIDE TO AFFORD-
ABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 21, 24 n.15 (Tim Iglesias & Rochelle E. Lento eds., 2d ed. 2011) 
 102 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65583 (West 2019). 
 103 See id. 
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through means including “the administration of land use and development con-
trols . . . .”104 The actions required of local governments include making sites 
available—if necessary by means of rezoning specific sites to allow greater 
density—with the zoning and services necessary to help accommodate the 
community’s “share of the regional housing need for each income level 
. . . .”105 In consultation with the state’s Department of Housing and Communi-
ty Development, regional councils determine and allocate among local juris-
dictions their “fair share” of regional housing needs.”106 
California lacks a builder’s remedy or appeal to a state board similar to 
those in New Jersey and Massachusetts.107 As Ngai Pindell observed, “[t]he 
strength of the California statute is its focus on procedure.”108 Its effect on 
housing supply is more ambiguous. As of 2007, the last year in which Califor-
nia published the overall compliance rate, eighty percent of local governments 
had adopted housing elements in compliance with state law.109 However, a 
subsequent independent tally found, as of July 2010, a compliance rate of only 
forty-two percent, which did grow to sixty-seven percent thirteen months lat-
er.110 
California does not maintain a database tracking each municipality’s af-
fordable housing production.111 One analysis of California municipalities 
                                                                                                                           
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. § 65583(c)(1); see also Pindell, supra note 101, at 26 n.28 (“Where the inventory analysis 
falls short of identifying sufficient sites to satisfy a jurisdiction’s share of regional housing needs, the 
jurisdiction’s schedule of actions must provide sufficient sites developable ‘by right’ to make up the 
shortfall in low- and very low-income sites demonstrated in the inventory.”) (citing CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 65583.2(c) (West 2019)). 
 106 Pindell, supra note 101, at 25. 
 107 As Chris Elmendorf notes in a forthcoming article, California has recently taken steps in the 
direction of a builder’s remedy. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Beyond the Double Veto: Land Use Plans 
as Preemptive Intergovernmental Contracts 28 (Feb. 9, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.
com/abstract=3256857 [https://perma.cc/UL4H-W573]. Elmendorf examines many of the same legal 
developments discussed in this paper, but he focuses in more detail on a broader set of reforms to 
California’s housing element law, arguing they have the greatest potential for easing restrictions of 
new housing development. His nuanced account frames California’s evolving regulatory framework 
as a form of “preemption by intergovernmental contract” and suggests ways to further strengthen it. 
See id. at 79. 
 108 Pindell, supra note 101, at 25; see also Steven J. Eagle, “Affordable Housing” as Metaphor, 
44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 301, 336 (2017) (“The California provisions are a complex and top-down 
array of nested plans and requirements.”). 
 109 RACHEL G. BRATT, CITIZEN’S HOUS. & PLANNING ASS’N, OVERCOMING RESTRICTIVE ZON-
ING FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN FIVE STATES: OBSERVATIONS FOR MASSACHUSETTS 137 (2012) 
(citing CAL. DEP’T OF HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., STATUS OF HOUSING ELEMENTS IN CALIFORNIA: 2007 
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE), https://www.chapa.org/sites/default/files/BrattOvercomingRestrictive
Zoning112012_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQ7U-FLYZ]. 
 110 Id. at 138. 
 111 Bratt & Vladeck, supra note 69, at 633 n.26 (“Perceptions concerning the effectiveness of the 
California statute must be tempered by the lack of a centralized housing production database that 
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found that compliance with the housing element law as of 1994 did not predict 
the number of permits for single-family or multi-family housing issued during 
the period of 1994 through 2000.112 Implementation challenges include signifi-
cant local noncompliance.113 As Jonathan Zasloff has observed: “the law has 
suffered from substantive gaps that the Legislature has been slow to close, 
most importantly, the lack of any requirement that cities actually hit their 
RHNA [Regional Housing Needs Assessment] number.”114 More generally, 
despite the complex set of laws in California requiring local governments to 
plan for their share of future housing needs, attorneys and housing advocates 
contend the laws are rarely enforced.115 Parts of California’s 2017 housing 
package seek to address these and other critiques of the state’s Housing Ac-
countability Act and housing element law.116 
D. Some Trends 
Chapter 40B, the Mount Laurel doctrine, and California’s Housing Ele-
ment adopt different approaches to pushing local governments to allow more 
housing development. Massachusetts provides affordable housing developers 
with a streamlined approval process and the opportunity to appeal adverse de-
cisions to the state. It encourages local governments to plan and zone for more 
housing through the promise of a safe harbor from state intervention. New Jer-
sey also provides a mechanism for developers to seek relief at the state level 
when a local government rejects a proposed development. The Mount Laurel 
doctrine shields municipalities from exclusionary zoning litigation if they take 
steps to plan for their fair share of the regional housing need. Massachusetts 
                                                                                                                           
would provide information on each jurisdiction’s housing needs, as specified in the housing elements, 
compared with housing production outcomes.”). 
 112 Paul G. Lewis, Can State Review of Local Planning Increase Housing Production?, 16 HOUS-
ING POL’Y DEBATE 173, 192 (2005) (“[California’s] method for overseeing local housing elements did 
not appear to result in a faster pace of residential development among municipalities that were seen as 
meeting their planning requirements, at least for the mid- to late1990s.”). 
 113 See generally LEWIS, supra note 101 (discussing implementation challenges). 
 114 See id; Jonathan Zasloff, The Price of Equality: Fair Housing, Land Use, and Disparate Im-
pact, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 98, 150 (2017). 
 115 See Irvin Dawid, Putting Teeth into the California Housing Accountability Act, PLANETIZEN 
(Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.planetizen.com/node/94377/putting-teeth-california-housing-account-
ability-act [https://perma.cc/C76F-CYGB]; Angela Hart, ‘Yes in My Backyard.’ Silicon Valley Money 
Fuels Fight Against State’s Housing Crisis, SACRAMENTO BEE (July 17, 2017), https://www.sacbee.
com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article161525828.html [https://perma.cc/C68Q-Y22X]; see 
also Elmendorf, supra note 107, at 36–37 (discussing critiques of California’s enforcement of state plan-
ning requirements). Although as this Article was about to be published, California’s new governor was 
taking new steps to enforce these laws. See supra note 4 (discussing lawsuit filed by state against Hun-
tington Beach). 
 116 See California’s 2017 Housing Package, CAL. DEP’T OF HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., http://www.
hcd.ca.gov/policy-research/lhp.shtml (summarizing six pieces of legislation); see also Elmendorf, 
supra note 107, at 38–48 (discussing California’s legislation and related housing reforms). 
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recently provided a mechanism through which municipalities with an approved 
“housing production plan” can be shielded from appeals to the HAC, but few 
jurisdictions have obtained such approval and comprehensive planning more 
generally receives little emphasis in Massachusetts.117 California differs from 
these two models as, at least until recently, it has not provided a specific mech-
anism for appealing adverse local decisions, instead emphasizing planning and 
procedural requirements. As noted, California appears to be the least effective 
of the three regimes, although recent legislation may change this. 
These state programs focus on planning requirements and procedural re-
forms and, in the case of New Jersey and Massachusetts (and now, to a limited 
degree, California), use the threat of state intervention in the review of a par-
ticular project to push local governments towards zoning reform. The appeal of 
an adverse local decision to a state entity can generate significant uncertainty 
for both developers and the local government subject to the decision. Such un-
certainty can, in turn, create significant information costs for potential devel-
opers. As Rick Hills and David Schleicher have argued in the context of discre-
tionary, piecemeal zoning, high information costs tend to reduce the marketa-
bility of land and the desirability of development in a particular jurisdiction.118 
The uncertainty generated by a potential appeal to the state might also indirect-
ly constrain the exercise of local authority.119 For example, developers in Mas-
sachusetts have been known to threaten using Chapter 40B for an affordable 
housing development in order to obtain concessions from a local government 
for a proposed development without affordable housing.120 To avoid the uncer-
tain outcome of a potential appeal, local governments might grant more con-
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Chapter 40 B Housing Production Plan, supra note 93. Although this provision creates an 
incentive for localities to develop a housing plan—in that doing so would allow it to avoid state interven-
tion—only approximately one-third of Massachusetts jurisdictions have done so and an even smaller 
number of plans have received a certificate of compliance. See MASS. DEP’T OF HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., 
CERTIFIED COMMUNITIES (revised Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/08/02/
CertComm.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5C4-FCQK] (identifying ten municipalities certified compliant); 
MASS. DEP’T OF HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., HOUSING PRODUCTION PLANS 760 CMR 56.03(4) FRE-
QUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2013), https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2018/09/18/hpfaq.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M9N7-7P2R] (stating that “[i]f a community has a DHCD approved HPP and is 
granted a DHCD certification of compliance with the plan, a decision by the Zoning Board Appeals 
(ZBA) to deny a Comprehensive Permit application will be deemed ‘Consistent with Local Needs’ 
under MGL Chapter 40B. ‘Consistent with Local Needs’ means the ZBA’s decision will be upheld by 
the Housing Appeals Committee (HAC)”). This may be due to the fact that in many municipalities 
there are few if any comprehensive permit applications. Bratt & Vladeck, supra note 69, at 600. 
 118 Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L. REV. 
91, 116 (2015). 
 119 Cf. DAVID J. BARRON ET AL., RAPPAPORT INST. FOR GREATER BOS., DISPELLING THE MYTH 
OF HOME RULE: LOCAL POWER IN GREATER BOSTON 9, 41 (discussing how uncertainty regarding 
scope of local authority can lead local governments to “exercise caution” in invoking that power). 
 120 Theodore C. Regnante & Paul J. Haverty, Compelling Reasons Why the Legislature Should 
Resist the Call to Repeal Chapter 40B, 88 MASS. L. REV. 77, 83 (2003). 
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cessions than they otherwise would. In addition, the fairly open-ended balancing 
inquiry under Chapter 40B—which weighs local concerns against regional hous-
ing needs—can create further uncertainty for local governments with regards to 
what local concerns are sufficiently compelling in a given instance. As the next 
Part explores in detail, more recent interventions reduce this uncertainty because 
they tend instead to directly displace specific aspects of local zoning. 
III. A NEW GENERATION OF STATE LAND USE INTERVENTIONS 
States preempt local government land use and housing policies in a num-
ber of areas. As Anika Singh Lemar carefully documents in a recent article, 
many of these interventions, which limit local regulation of specific land uses, 
are not new.121 They include measures in the realms of family day cares, group 
homes, manufactured housing, and small-scale alternative energy infrastruc-
ture.122 In addition, thirty-one states prohibit rent control statewide and many 
of these restrictions have been in place for decades.123 
In more recent years, states have increasingly prohibited local mandatory 
inclusionary zoning programs, starting with Virginia (in 1997)124 and Texas (in 
2005).125 More recently, Arizona (in 2015),126 Tennessee (in 2016),127 Kansas 
(in 2016),128 and Wisconsin (in 2018)129 have imposed their own restrictions. 
As the “sharing economy” has grown in prominence over the past few years, a 
number of states have constrained and in some cases essentially prohibited 
local efforts to regulate short-term rentals, including Arizona,130 Florida,131 
                                                                                                                           
 121 Lemar, supra note 2, at 2–3. 
 122 Id. at 3. 
 123 Rent Control Laws by State, NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUS. COUNCIL (Aug. 29, 2018), https://
www.nmhc.org/research-insight/analysis-and-guidance/rent-control-laws-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/
5QMD-YHMA]. 
 124 H 2156, Ch. 607, 1997 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 1997) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 15.2-2305 (2016)). A separate, more permissive, provision applies to certain parts of the state. Id. 
§ 15.2-2304. 
 125 H.B. 2266, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005) (codified at TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 214.905 (West 2016)). 
 126 S.B. 1072, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2015) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-461.16 
(2015)). 
 127 S.B. 1636, 110th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2016) (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-
35-102 (2007 & Supp. 2018)). 
 128 S.B. 366, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2016) (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-16,120 
(West 2018)). 
 129 2017 A.B. 770, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2017) (codified at WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 66.1015(3) (West 2018)). 
 130 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.39 (2018) (“A city or town may not prohibit vacation rentals 
or short-term rentals.”). 
 131 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 509.032(7)(b) (West 2016) (“A local law, ordinance, or regulation may not 
prohibit vacation rentals or regulate the duration or frequency of rental of vacation rentals.”). 
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New York,132 Utah,133 Tennessee,134 Idaho,135 and Indiana.136 Although the mo-
tivations for and practical effects of these particular interventions differ, collec-
tively they suggest an increased willingness of state governments to displace 
local regulation in a range of contexts related to housing and land use. 
This Part analyzes a particular set of recent states’ interventions focused 
on increasing housing supply by mandating streamlined local development 
approval processes, constraining local discretion, or directly displacing local 
zoning. The discussion focuses on legal developments and proposals on the 
West Coast (particularly in California) and the Northeast (particularly in Mas-
sachusetts). These areas of the country are marked by high housing prices as 
well as particularly onerous land use regulations, so it is not surprising that 
they are also where reform efforts have first begun.137 Part III then shifts to a 
closer examination of one specific trend: state laws allowing single-family 
homeowners to develop accessory dwelling units. Although narrow in scope, 
these laws are particularly intrusive, displacing local zoning regulations that 
would restrict or impede certain forms of housing development. Debates over 
accessory dwelling units (“ADUs”) also provide unique insights on the tension 
between a state interest in increased housing production and countervailing 
interests of local control. 
                                                                                                                           
 132 N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 121 (McKinney 2016 & Supp. 2019) (prohibiting advertising of a 
dwelling unit for term of less than thirty consecutive days). 
 133 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-8-85.4, 17-50-338 (LexisNexis 2018) (“[A] legislative body may not 
. . . enact or enforce an ordinance that prohibits an individual from listing or offering a short-term 
rental on a short-term rental website.”). 
 134 S.B. 1086, 110th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2018) (to be codified at TENN. CODE. ANN. 
§ 66-38-104) (“[A] local governing body shall not . . . [p]rohibit the use of property as a short-term 
rental unit.”). 
 135 H.B. 216, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2017) (codified at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6539 
(2018) (“Neither a county nor a city may enact or enforce any ordinance that has the express or practi-
cal effect of prohibiting short-term rentals or vacation rentals in the county or city.”). 
 136 H.E.A. 1035, 120th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2018) (codified at IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 36-1-24-8 (2018)) (“A short term rental of owner occupied short term rental property is a permitted 
residential use under any applicable zoning ordinance of a unit and may not be disallowed by any 
zoning ordinance . . . in a zoning district or classification of a unit that permits residential use.”). 
 137 See Fischel, supra note 60, at 13 (“It is now well established that in certain areas of the na-
tion—the Northeast and West Coast especially—local land use regulation is associated with unusually 
high housing prices.”); see also S.B. 2144, 189th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017) (“Whereas, 
credible studies and reports have documented that Massachusetts’ antiquated and confusing frame-
work of municipal, zoning, subdivision control, and planning laws promotes inefficient land use prac-
tices that are contrary to smart growth.”). State-level zoning reform efforts are, however, starting to 
spread to non-coastal and more conservative states, including Utah. See Nolan Gray & Brandon Fuller, A 
Red-State Take on a YIMBY Housing Bill, CITYLAB (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.citylab.com/
perspective/2019/02/affordable-housing-bill-utah-california-zoning-reform-sb34/583075/ [https://perma.
cc/4CZV-DX2A] (discussing Utah State Senate Bill 34, which would require local governments to 
plan and take steps to encourage development of more affordable housing). 
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A. The New Housing Preemption 
1. California 
The past three years have seen a flurry of state-wide housing and land use 
reform bills in California. California’s Assembly Bill 2501, passed into law in 
2016, amended the state’s density bonus law, which was first introduced in 
1979. The density bonus law requires local governments in California to grant 
developers a density bonus—enabling them to build a larger project—for any 
development with a minimum share of affordable housing.138 The law, howev-
er, was rarely invoked by developers.139 Assembly Bill 2501 mandated that 
localities adopt more streamlined and simplified approval processes for such 
developments, making the program more attractive to developers.140 This fol-
lowed a 2015 amendment to the density bonus law, which limited the number 
of parking spaces a city or county could require in a development with afford-
able units and located near public transit.141 By reducing the minimum parking 
requirements local governments could impose, that law sought to reduce de-
velopment costs and “[a]llow for more effective use of the density bonus 
law.”142 
These laws were merely the prelude to fifteen bills related to housing 
passed into law in 2017.143 Collectively these bills, in the words of one com-
                                                                                                                           
 138 See Jenny Schuetz et al., 31 Flavors of Inclusionary Zoning: Comparing Policies from San 
Francisco, Washington, DC, and Suburban Boston, 75 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 441, 442 (2009) (“Since 
1979, [California] state law has required that each city and county provide density bonuses to devel-
opers seeking to build affordable or age-restricted housing.”) (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65915 
(2019)). The law “essentially creates a voluntary IZ [inclusionary zoning] program in jurisdictions 
without local IZ.” Id. at 443. Inclusionary zoning programs, which typically are adopted at the local 
level, “either require developers to make a certain percentage of the units within their market rate 
residential developments available at prices or rents that are affordable to specified income groups, or 
offer incentives that encourage them to do so.” Id. at 441. 
 139 Id. at 443 (citing interviews with local officials). 
 140 A.B. 2501, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65915). 
 141 A.B. 744, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE. § 65915(q)(2)) 
(“[I]f a development includes the maximum percentage of low- or very low income units provided for in 
paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (f) and is located within one-half mile of a major transit stop, as 
defined in subdivision (b) of Section 21155 of the Public Resources Code, and there is unobstructed 
access to the major transit stop from the development, then, upon the request of the developer, a city, 
county, or city and county shall not impose a vehicular parking ratio, inclusive of handicapped and 
guest parking, that exceeds 0.5 spaces per bedroom.”). 
 142 See Cal. A.B. 744 (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE. § 65915(q)(3)). 
 143 California’s 2017 Housing Package, supra note 116; see Jeff Collins, Housing Crisis: See How 
State Lawmakers Are Putting More Teeth—and More Money—into Reform, ORANGE CTY. REG. (Sept. 
24, 2017), https://www.ocregister.com/2017/09/24/housing-crisis-see-how-state-lawmakers-are-putting-
more-teeth-and-more-money-into-reform/ [https://perma.cc/5DBW-RT78]; Antonio Pacheco, California 
Moves to Relieve Housing Crisis with Key Legislative Wins, ARCHITECT’S NEWSPAPER (Sept. 15, 2017), 
https://archpaper.com/2017/09/california-affordable-housing-reform-bills/ [https://perma.cc/AC5H-
Z4CT]; Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown, Governor Brown Signs Comprehensive 
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mentator, “amounted to the first key win for state-led housing reform ef-
forts.”144 In addition to providing new funding for affordable housing, the leg-
islation aimed at reducing regulations, streamlining approval processes, and 
strengthening the obligations of local governments under existing state housing 
laws and the mechanisms for enforcing these obligations.145 In what follows, I 
focus specifically on measures that constrain local discretion to reject new de-
velopment or take steps to liberalize local zoning. 
Among the most notable of these laws, Senate Bill 35 streamlined the ap-
proval process for certain new housing—particularly urban infill develop-
ment—in municipalities that failed to satisfy their obligations, under the hous-
ing element law, to provide for regional housing needs.146 In early 2018, the 
California Department of Housing and Community Development released a 
list that showed ninety-eight percent of local jurisdictions were not meeting 
their goals with regards to the regional housing need.147 In jurisdictions that 
have issued fewer building permits than necessary to satisfy their share of the 
regional housing need,148 S.B. 35 allows developers of multi-family housing 
on infill sites149 to obtain streamlined approvals, via a ministerial process and 
not subject to a conditional use permit, if they satisfy certain “objective plan-
ning standards” and provide a certain percentage of affordable units.150 These 
                                                                                                                           
Legislative Package to Increase State’s Housing Supply and Affordability (Sept. 29, 2017), https://
www.ca.gov/archive/gov39/2017/09/29/news19979/index.html [https://perma.cc/UJ8W-624E]. 
 144 Antonio Pacheco, A Wave of Affordable and Market-rate Housing Could Soon Wash Ashore in 
California, ARCHITECT’S NEWSPAPER (Jan. 31, 2018), https://archpaper.com/2018/01/wave-affordable-
housing-soon-wash-ashore-california/ [https://perma.cc/6DWC-E8GW]. 
 145 See, e.g., S.B. 167, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE. 
§ 65589.5 (2019)) (strengthening state’s Housing Accountability Act, in part by raising burden of 
proof for denials of certain affordable housing projects and imposing automatic fines for violations); 
A.B. 1397, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE. §§ 65580, 65583, 
65583.2) (requiring that land included in inventory under housing element must be not only suitable 
for development, but also available). 
 146 S.B. 35, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE. § 65913.4 
(2019)). 
 147 See CAL. DEP’T OF HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., SB 35 STATEWIDE DETERMINATION SURVEY (Jan. 31, 
2018), http://www.hcd.ca.gov/community-development/housing-element/docs/SB35_StatewideDeter-
mination Summary01312018.pdf [https://perma.cc/XVE2-6DHB]; see also Jeff Collins, 98% of Cali-
fornia Jurisdictions Fail to Approve Adequate Housing, State Report Finds, ORANGE CTY. REG. (Feb. 
2, 2018), https://www.ocregister.com/2018/02/01/98-of-calif-jurisdictions-fail-to-approve-adequate-
housing-state-report-finds/ [https://perma.cc/6K9D-R3PH]. 
 148 Specifically, S.B. 35 provides for “streamlined, ministerial approval” of projects “located in a 
locality that the department has determined is subject to this subparagraph on the basis that the num-
ber of units that have been issued building permits is less than the locality’s share of the regional 
housing needs, by income category, for that reporting period.” Cal. S.B. 35 § 3(a)(4)(A). 
 149 Id. More specifically the site must be one “in which at least 75 percent of the perimeter of the 
site adjoins parcels that are developed with urban uses.” Id. § 3(a)(2)(B). 
 150 Id. As of January 2018 only thirteen cities and counties had satisfied their Regional Housing 
Needs Assessment and as such were not subject to the streamlined approval process provided for by 
SB 35. See SB 35 STATEWIDE DETERMINATION SURVEY, supra note 147, at 1. Separate legislation, 
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objective standards must “involve no personal or subjective judgment by a 
public official and [be] uniformly verifiable by reference to an external and 
uniform benchmark or criterion available and knowable by both the develop-
ment applicant or proponent and the public official prior to submittal.”151 If it 
denies approval, a local government must document which of the specified 
objective planning standards a proposed development violates.152 
Assembly Bill 73 took a different approach to the state’s housing crisis. It 
provides local governments with incentives to establish “housing sustainability 
districts” in areas within one-half mile of public transit.153 Environmental and 
planning reviews are completed in advance for the district, the approval pro-
cess for individual housing developments is streamlined, and those develop-
ments are not subject to a project-specific legal challenge under the California 
Environmental Quality Act.154 At least twenty percent of units in the district 
must be subject to affordability restrictions and ten percent of units in any in-
dividual development must be affordable to lower-income households.155 Es-
tablishing such a district entitles a local government to receive incentive pay-
ments from the state, based upon the number of new units constructed within 
the district.156 A.B. 73 functions similarly to Massachusetts’s Chapter 40R.157 
Under these systems, as Edward Glaeser observed, communities that are too 
restrictive with regard to new development pay a transfer fee to the state that is 
then passed on to communities that allow more development.158 The effective-
ness of such incentives is dependent on the state’s commitment to funding 
                                                                                                                           
Senate Bill 166, further strengthened the housing element law by requiring local governments, if they 
reduced the residential density of a parcel, to make written findings that “the reduction is consistent” 
with their housing element and the remaining sites in the housing element are adequate “to accommo-
date the jurisdiction’s share of the regional housing need.” S.B. 166, 2017 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2017) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE. § 65863). If the jurisdiction’s reduction of a parcel’s densi-
ty would result in the remaining sites being inadequate to meet that need, the jurisdiction must “iden-
tif[y] sufficient additional, adequate, and available sites with an equal or greater residential density in 
the jurisdiction so that there is no net loss of residential unit capacity.” Id. 
 151 Cal. S.B. 35 § 3(a)(5). 
 152 Id. § 3(b)(1). 
 153 A.B. 73, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE. § 65582.1 
(2018) and adding additional sections). 
 154 Id. 
 155 See id. § 2. 
 156 See id. A separate bill, Senate Bill 540, allows local governments to create Workforce Hous-
ing Opportunity Zones. See S.B. 540, 2017 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). Similar to Hous-
ing Sustainability Districts, environmental and planning reviews (which are eligible for financial sup-
port from the state) are completed when the zone is designated, allowing for expedited review of qual-
ified housing developments (without a new environmental review). Half of the units in a development 
must be affordable to moderate- or low-income households. 
 157 See infra notes 188–190 and accompanying text (describing Chapter 40R). 
 158 Glaeser, supra note 42. 
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them.159 Funding for Massachusetts 40R and for a related provision that reim-
burses school costs has run short at times.160 
The most controversial and high profile recent housing bill in California, 
Senate Bill 827, was introduced in 2018 but failed to even make it out of 
committee.161 S.B. 827 would have altered the applicable zoning for any 
“transit-rich housing project,” defined as a residential development “the par-
cels of which are all within a [one-half] mile radius of a major transit stop or a 
[one-quarter] mile radius of a high-quality [transit] bus corridor.”162 Such pro-
jects would have received a “transit-rich housing bonus,” exempting them 
from local density controls, minimum parking requirements, design standards 
that hinder the ability to construct the maximum number of units that can be 
developed, and height restrictions of less than fifty-five feet, depending on the 
project’s distance from a “high-quality transit corridor” or “major transit 
stop.”163 The bill, as one commentator summed it up, “would ensure that all 
new housing construction within a half-mile of a train station or a quarter-mile 
of a frequent bus route would not be subject to local regulations concerning 
size, height, number of apartments, restrictive design standards, or the provi-
sion of parking spaces.”164 
Although it signified a radical break with the American tradition of local 
control over zoning, S.B. 827 would not have led to high-rise construction. 
Rather it would have allowed for more mid-size development in the form of 
“side-by-side duplexes, eight-unit apartment buildings, [and] six-story build-
ings . . . .”165 In recent years housing advocates, architects, developers, and 
elected officials have sought to ease the development of these and other mid-
size housing typologies, sometimes collectively referred to as “missing mid-
                                                                                                                           
 159 I am grateful to Chris Elmendorf for raising this point. 
 160 CITIZENS’ HOUS. & PLANNING ASS’N, supra note 75, at 24. 
 161 S.B. 827, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 162 Cal. S.B. 827 § 2. 
 163 Id. A “high-quality transit corridor” was defined as “a corridor with fixed route bus service that 
. . . has service intervals of no more than 15 minutes” during peak commute hours. Id. The original ver-
sion of the bill would have permitted builds as high as 85 feet in certain areas, but a subsequent amend-
ment removed that maximum height allowance. See Scott Wiener, SB 827 Amendments: Affordability, 
Transit Lines, Height, Ellis Act Protections & More, MEDIUM (Apr. 9, 2018), https://medium.com@
Scott_Wiener/sb-827-amendments-affordability-transit-lines-height-ellis-act-protections-more-fae09
ee3f897 [https://perma.cc/3QNJ-36TZ]. The amendment also “limit[ed] the bill’s height increases to 
rail, subway, and ferry stops (with bus stops still triggering density increases, though not height in-
creases).” Id. 
 164 Henry Graber, California Bill Would Allow Unrestricted Housing by Transit, Solve State Hous-
ing Crisis, SLATE (Jan. 5, 2018), https://slate.com/business/2018/01/california-bill-sb827-residential-
zoning-transit-awesome.html [https://perma.cc/NR9G-K7YQ]. 
 165 Adam Rogers, A Bid to Solve California’s Housing Crisis Could Redraw How Cities Grow, 
WIRED (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/scott-weiner-california-housing-bill-cities/ [https://
perma.cc/GFB9-APAE]. 
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dle” housing.166 These housing types—which fall between large-lot single-
family detached homes and large multi-family apartment complexes—are 
championed as a form of “gentle density.”167 They frequently take the form of 
infill developments that proponents contend will have minimal effects on 
neighborhood character, but that collectively hold promise for alleviating re-
gional housing needs and enabling entry into more desirable neighborhoods. 
S.B. 827 sparked considerable opposition from, among others, those who 
feared a loss of local control,168 suggested it would have adverse environmen-
tal effects,169 and cautioned it could lead to significant displacement of existing 
residents.170 The bill’s advocates disputed the former and amended the measure 
to address the latter.171 Although S.B. 827 ultimately failed to get out of com-
mittee, it did raise the profile of zoning reform nationwide and arguably helped 
move the conversation forward on more modest housing reform efforts.172 As 
Ilya Somin observed, S.B. 827’s most significant contribution may have been 
                                                                                                                           
 166 Robert Steuteville, Great Idea: Missing Middle Housing, PUB. SQUARE (Mar. 22, 2017), 
https://www.cnu.org/publicsquare/2017/03/22/great-idea-missing-middle-housing [https://perma.cc/
6MKB-6JDY]; see also Katherine Shaver, Cities Turn to ‘Missing Middle’ Housing to Keep Older Mil-
lennials from Leaving, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/traffic
andcommuting/cities-turn-to-missing-middle-housing-to-keep-older-millennials-from-leaving/2017/
12/09/3a129bc8-d54a-11e7-95bf-df7c19270879_story.html?utm_term=.5bb7dfd14930 [https://perma.
cc/8ENM-JEBH] (discussing efforts by local governments to revise zoning laws to allow development of 
small multi-unit housing). See generally MISSING MIDDLE HOUSING, http://missingmiddlehousing.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/77BJ-D38D] (for further discussion of missing middle housing). 
 167 See, e.g., Alex Bozikovic, The Missing Middle in Toronto’s Housing Debate, GLOBE & MAIL 
(Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/art-and-architecture/article-the-missing-middle-
in-torontos-housing-debate/ [https://perma.cc/Q2PE-SXCK] (discussing a candidate for Toronto mayor 
who championed “gentle density” in form of duplexes, triplexes, and small apartment buildings). 
 168 See Jane Kim, SB 827 Postmortem: Let’s Build More Housing the Right Way, S.F. EXAMINER 
(Apr. 25, 2018), http://www.sfexaminer.com/sb-827-postmortem-lets-build-housing-right-way/ [https://
perma.cc/6XMT-7ZND] (explaining that “this bill proposed to take away our ability to negotiate and 
have a conversation about what works in our neighborhoods and communities”). But see Scott Wiener, 
SB 827 Retains an Awful Lot of Local Control and Community Planning, MEDIUM (Apr. 8, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@Scott_Wiener/sb-827-retains-an-awful-lot-of-local-control-and-community-
planning-b1d111fc1007 [https://perma.cc/ZB9G-6ENS]. 
 169 See infra notes 325–326 and accompanying text. 
 170 David Roberts, The Future of Housing Policy Is Being Decided in California, VOX (Apr. 4, 
2018), https://www.vox.com/cities-and-urbanism/2018/2/23/17011154/sb827-california-housing-crisis 
[https://perma.cc/Z86G-TWT3]. 
 171 Scott Wiener, SB 827 Amendments: Strengthening Demolition & Displacement Protections, 
MEDIUM (Feb. 27, 2018), https://medium.com/@Scott_Wiener/sb-827-amendments-strengthening-
demolition-displacement-protections-4ced4c942ac9 [https://perma.cc/MQ9A-PUBK]. 
 172 See Nolan Gray, The YIMBYs Lost in California. But They’re Just Getting Started, CITYLAB 
(Apr. 26, 2018) (discussing multiple bills in California to strengthen “fair share” housing requirements 
and ease restrictions on new housing); see also Graber, supra note 164 (describing S.B. 827 as repre-
sentative of “a reassuring trend in California politics: the rising tide in the statehouse to overwhelm 
local restrictions on housing construction”). 
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to “expand[] the ‘Overton Window’ of policy options that become a part of 
mainstream discourse.”173 
In December 2018, California State Senator Scott Weiner, who sponsored 
S.B. 827, introduced a number of new measures, including Senate Bill 50, the 
More HOMES (Housing, Opportunity, Mobility, Equity, and Stability) Act.174 
Like S.B. 827, the new bill would override local zoning to promote greater 
housing density near transit.175 But it responds to criticisms of the earlier bill 
by providing stronger protections from displacement in lower-income commu-
nities176 and by enabling denser development not only near transit, but also in 
those areas that are close to jobs.177 The latter addition is designed in part to 
address concerns that higher opportunity neighborhoods would resist new pub-
lic transportation so as to avoid being subject to the law. Senate Bill 50 also 
delays implementation, and provides for greater local control in “sensitive 
communities” that are “vulnerable to displacement pressures.”178 The new bill 
has garnered support from groups that opposed S.B. 827, including the state 
Building Trades Council and some tenant’s rights groups.179 At the same time, 
Wiener separately introduced a Constitutional Amendment, to be placed on the 
ballot in 2020.180 That Amendment would, if it passed, pull back on local con-
                                                                                                                           
 173 Ilya Somin, California Bill Cutting Back Zoning Could Increase Access to Housing and Jobs for 
Millions, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 9, 2018), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/01/09/california-bill-
cutting-back-on-zoning-c/print [https://perma.cc/8Y2S-QGFB]. 
 174 S.B. 50, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/bill
TextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200SB50 [https://perma.cc/4EPM-5Y5Z]; see also Scott Wiener, 
Senator Wiener Introduces Zoning Reform Bill to Allow More Housing Near Public Transportation 
and Job Centers, MEDIUM (Dec. 4, 2018), https://medium.com/@Scott_Wiener/senator-wiener-
introduces-zoning-reform-bill-to-allows-more-housing-near-public-transportation-and-3fb77b794004 
[https://perma.cc/Y3Q2-PE4B]. 
 175 Wiener, supra note 174. Specifically, the More HOMES Act “eliminates density restrictions” 
at “sites within ½ mile of fixed rail and ¼ mile of high-frequency bus stops and in job-rich areas,” 
allowing for construction of apartment buildings. Id. 
 176 Id. (“Since SB 827’s demise, Senator Wiener has worked with a broad coalition of stakehold-
ers to recraft the bill, in order to protect vulnerable communities.”). Among other things, the new 
legislation would not apply to housing occupied by renters within the previous seven years. See Cal. 
S.B. 50. 
 177 Cal. S.B. 50. The bill allows for denser development in “either a job-rich housing project or 
transit-rich housing project.” It defines the former as “an area identified by the Department of Housing 
and Community Development and the Office of Planning and Research, based on indicators such as 
proximity to jobs, high area median income relative to the relevant region, and high-quality public 
schools, as an area of high opportunity close to jobs.” Id. 
 178 Id. Such communities would be able to develop, through a “community-led planning process” 
their own plans for increasing housing development. Id. The precise details of the alternatives availa-
ble to such communities are to be provided in subsequent legislation. Id.; see also Liam Dillon, Cali-
fornia Legislator Revives Bill to Boost Apartment Complexes Near Transit, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 4, 
2018), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-housing-transit-bill-20181204-story.html [https://
perma.cc/WWC9-P7MQ] (reporting that “key details . . . remain unresolved”). 
 179 See Randy Shaw, Momentum Builds for SB 50, BEYONDCHRON (Dec. 11, 2018), http://
beyondchron.org/momentum-builds-for-ca-sb-50-and-morehomes/ [https://perma.cc/R4WT-VDAG]. 
 180 Sen. Const. Amend. 1, Leg., 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
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trol by repealing a provision of the state constitution that requires local voters 
to approve low-income housing that receives public funding.181 
In 2018, California did enact separate measures to strengthen the state’s 
housing element law and further promote new development.182 These include 
Assembly Bill 2923, which requires the Bay Area Rapid Transit system to 
adopt new transit-oriented development zoning standards for land around sta-
tions and requires local governments to adopt zoning that conforms to those 
standards.183 
California’s ongoing debates over state-wide zoning interventions are 
shaped, to a significant degree, by questions of how to best calibrate the bal-
ance of state and local power. Senate Bill 827 generated significant opposition 
among communities concerned about the displacement of lower-income resi-
dents. Senate Bill 50 attempts to address this concern both by not providing 
zoning relief to properties occupied by renters within the previous seven years 
and by granting greater local control to communities with significant dis-
placement risks.184 At the same time, the new bill, by applying to both “transit-
rich” and “job-rich” areas, would limit the ability of more affluent communi-
ties to undermine the goal of greater density by resisting public transporta-
tion.185 Some environmental groups opposed to S.B. 827 emphasized this po-
tential secondary effect of deterring investment in new public transportation.186 
These differing responses suggest a calibration of state and local power based, 
in significant part, on an initial determination, by the state, of what local con-
cerns merit consideration and justify a degree of local control. 
                                                                                                                           
 181 Diego Aguilar-Canabal, Senator Wiener Launches Three Big Bills to Tackle Housing Woes, BAY 
CITY BEACON (Dec. 9, 2018), https://www.thebaycitybeacon.com/politics/senator-wiener-launches-
three-big-bills-to-tackle-housing-woes/article_879ff8aa-fbf4-11e8-8528-bf6da5ef84bc.html [https://
perma.cc/ES57-5GNQ]. 
 182 See Melanie Curry, Legislative Update: Governor Brown’s Last Bills, STREETSBLOG CAL. 
(Oct. 1, 2018), https://cal.streetsblog.org/2018/10/01/legislative-update-governor-browns-last-bills/ 
[https://perma.cc/6M9Z-VUAW]. 
 183 A.B. 2923, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/
billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB2923 [https://perma.cc/6LGH-J5EG]. These standards 
would promote density within one-half mile of transit stops by imposing minimum height, density, 
and floor area ratios and maximum parking requirements. Id. The legislative findings for A.B. 2923 
acknowledge that the law diminishes the land use authority of cities and continues, but note that the 
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, which oversees the transit system, “is unique as a 
transit agency in that it is governed by an elected board of directors, granting the people of the San 
Francisco Bay Area a greater measure of input on the district’s decisions than the constituents of other 
agencies have on their agencies.” Id. 
 184 See Cal. S.B. 50. 
 185 See id. 
 186 See infra notes 325–327 and accompanying text. 
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2. Massachusetts 
Zoning reform has garnered significant attention but far less action at the 
state level in Massachusetts, another state with high housing prices and notably 
restrictive zoning. According to a March 2016 report by a Special Senate 
Committee on Housing, despite significant demand, 207 of Massachusetts’s 
351 cities and towns “have permitted no multifamily housing with more than 5 
units in over a decade and over a third of our communities have permitted only 
single family housing.”187 In addition to the stick of an appeal to the state’s 
HAC under Chapter 40B, Massachusetts uses carrots, in the form of financial 
incentives, to encourage municipal governments to end exclusionary zoning 
practices. In 2004 Massachusetts passed the Smart Growth Zoning Overlay 
District Act, colloquially known as “Chapter 40R”.188 Chapter 40R encourages 
localities to create dense, transit-oriented residential and mixed-use zoning 
districts, allowing development to proceed either as-of-right or following a 
limited review process.189 These “smart growth zoning districts,” following 
review and approval by the state, render communities eligible for payments 
from a state Smart Growth Housing Trust Fund, in addition to other financial 
incentives.190 
In December 2017, Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker announced an 
initiative to increase statewide housing production. It includes, among other 
measures, “a new system of incentives and rewards for municipalities that de-
liver sustainable housing growth.”191 In a letter to the state legislature, the gov-
ernor emphasized that “[b]y providing incentives and tools rather than man-
dates, the Housing Choice Initiative respects local decision making.”192 Com-
munities that receive a Housing Choice Designation—by “producing new 
housing and . . . adopt[ing] best practices to promote sustainable housing de-
                                                                                                                           
 187 SPECIAL SENATE COMM. ON HOUS., FACING MASSACHUSETTS’ HOUSING CRISIS 22 (2016), 
https://ma-smartgrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/Final_Housing_Report_3-1-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K4DJ-JG3A]; see also Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A. Ward, The Causes and Consequences of Land 
Use Regulation: Evidence from Greater Boston, 65 J. URB. ECON. 265, 266 (2009) (noting significant 
increase in land use regulation in eastern Massachusetts since 1980). 
 188 Chapter 40R, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/service-details/chapter-40r [https://perma.
cc/8689-MCNP]. See generally CITIZENS’ HOUS. AND PLANNING ASS’N, THE USE OF CHAPTER 40R 
IN MASSACHUSETTS: 2018 UPDATE (2018), https://www.chapa.org/sites/default/files/TheUseofCh
40R_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY7U-YPNQ]. 
 189 See CITIZENS’ HOUS. AND PLANNING ASS’N, supra note 188. 
 190 Id. at 24; see also Salsich, supra note 77, at 89. 
 191 Press Release, Office of Governor Charlie Baker, Baker-Polito Administration Announces New 
Housing Choice Initiative (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.mass.gov/news/baker-polito-administration-
announces-new-housing-choice-initiative [https://perma.cc/QS9J-9YS6]. 
 192 Letter from Governor Charlie Baker to Mass. House of Representatives regarding H.B. No. 
4075 (Dec. 11, 2017), https://malegislature.gov/Bills/190/H4075.pdf [https://perma.cc/T49N-6T7V]. 
A new draft of the legislation is identified as H. 4290. See H. 4290, 190th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. 
(Mass. 2017). 
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velopment”—will have access to new Housing Choice Capital Grants as well 
as priority access to other state funding.193 
In addition to this new incentive program, Governor Baker proposed leg-
islation that would have allowed cities and towns to adopt specific zoning 
measures by a majority vote (the norm in most states), rather than the two-
thirds vote currently required by state law.194 The measures local governments 
would be permitted to approve with a simple majority include reduced mini-
mum lot sizes, adoption of smart growth zoning districts, permitting multi-
family and mixed-use developments in certain areas, and allowing ADUs—all 
measures directed towards increasing housing supply and density. 
Two separate bills, House Bill 4397, An Act Building for the Future of the 
Commonwealth,195 and Senate Bill 81, An Act Promoting Housing and Sus-
tainable Development,196 would have gone further, directly displacing ele-
ments of local zoning. The legislation, an earlier version of which passed the 
state Senate, was championed by the Massachusetts Smart Growth Alliance 
and a broad array of community organizations.197 Among other measures to 
promote or mandate denser development, the bills proposed allowing property 
owners statewide to add an internal ADU on any lot of five thousand square 
feet or more.198 The Senate version required local ordinances to “provide at 
least 1 district of reasonable size in which multi-family housing is a permitted 
use as of right”.199 The legislation faced opposition from the Massachusetts 
Municipal Association on the grounds that it would, by mandating by-right 
                                                                                                                           
 193 Housing Choice Initiative, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., https://www.mass.gov/housing-
choice-initiative initiative [https://perma.cc/W7KS-AY2U]. 
 194 Baker, supra note 4. As of December 2018, the bill was still being considered in the informal 
session of the state legislature, during which a bill can be defeated by a single “no” vote. Tim Logan, A 
Year After Baker’s Push for More Housing, It’s Still in Limbo, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 4, 2018), https://
www.bostonglobe.com/business/2018/12/03/there-housing-stalemate-beacon-hill/5n7umBjRHTrMRa
3HJAP1bK/story.html [https://perma.cc/B5QE-KAVA]. 
 195 An Act Building for the Future of the Commonwealth, H. 4397, 190th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. 
(Mass. 2018). The original bill, No. 2420, was reported out of the committee on Municipalities and Re-
gional Government as No. 4397. See Bill H.2420, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., https://malegislature.
gov/Bills/190/H2420 [https://perma.cc/9RCZ-FZP2] (“Accompanied a new draft, see H4397.”). 
 196 An Act Promoting Housing and Sustainable Development, S. 81, 190th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. 
(Mass. 2017). 
 197 Great Neighborhoods Legislation, GREAT NEIGHBORHOODS, https://www.great-neighbor
hoods.org/legislation [https://perma.cc/W59B-68Q3] (listing campaign supporters). 
 198 Mass. H. 4397, § 5; Mass. S. 81, § 5. 
 199 Mass. S. 81, § 6. The district would be required to “have a minimum gross density of 8 units 
per acre in rural towns and a minimum gross density of 14 units per acre in all other municipalities.” 
In 2016 the Senate passed a bill that included this requirement. See An Act Promoting Housing and 
Sustainable Development, S. 2311, 189th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2016). The original House 
bill is less categorical on this point, requiring that zoning ordinances “provide reasonable and realistic 
opportunities for the development of multi-family housing.” See H. 2420, 190th Gen. Court, Reg. 
Sess. § 6 (Mass. 2017). However, the subsequent house version, H. 4397, removes this provision 
entirely. See Mass. H.B. 4397. 
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ADU development and multi-family districts, “override[] basic zoning and 
permitting authority at the local level.”200 Ultimately, neither Governor Baker’s 
bill nor the other bills were brought to the floor of the state House of Repre-
sentatives for a vote.201 Nonetheless, these efforts suggest a growing willing-
ness to consider statewide action to ease local zoning and an openness to, in 
addition to providing incentives for denser development, displacing specific 
local restrictions or mandating particular forms of local zoning. 
The next section explores a growing trend of state laws mandating that 
local governments permit development of ADUs on single-family properties. 
Although small in scale, these interventions directly displace a specific ele-
ment of local zoning. 
B. Yes in My (Own) Backyard 
1. Accessory Dwelling Units 
In different forms, ADUs, both legally and illegally built, have long been 
a part of the housing landscape.202 In addition to the acute need for more hous-
ing in high-demand areas, recent interest in ADUs is fueled by changing de-
mographics, which have increased demand for a variety of non-traditional 
housing typologies.203 The number of multigenerational households is rising 
and the share of Americans sixty-five and over is expected to increase from 
thirteen percent of the population in 2010 to nineteen percent in 2030.204 In 
addition, more individuals are living alone and the average household size is 
shrinking, resulting in a mismatch in many places between available housing 
and the needs of potential residents.205 
Proponents argue that ADUs increase housing supply incrementally with 
minimal effect on neighborhood character, potentially blunting opposition to 
                                                                                                                           
 200 Geoff Beckwith, Legislature Should Protect Local Decision-Making Over Zoning, Land Use, 
MASS. MUN. ASS’N (Nov. 2017), https://www.mma.org/advocacy/legislature-should-protect-local-
decision-making-over-zoning-land-use/ [https://perma.cc/E5PZ-6XV6]. 
 201 Katie Lannan, Muni Officials Reflect on Demise of Housing Production Bill, STATE HOUSE 
NEWS SERV. (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.statehousenews.com/?login=yes&trial=yes&path=cms/
news.aspx&yr=2018&select=20181691 [https://perma.cc/H4GQ-TNLQ]. 
 202 See Tom Daniels, Zoning for Accessory Housing, 7 ZONING PRAC. 1, 7 (2012) (“The accesso-
ry housing concept is an old idea, but has seen renewed interest over the past 30 years and especially 
since the rise in real estate prices in the late 1990s.”). 
 203 See Infranca, supra note 21, at 56–61 (discussing demographic changes); Patrick Sisson, How a 
Return to Multigenerational Living Is Shifting the Housing Market, CURBED (Nov. 21, 2017), https://
www.curbed.com/2017/11/21/16682850/multigenerational-homes-millennials-immigration-family 
[https://perma.cc/254T-64D4]. 
 204 Arthur C. Nelson, The New Urbanity: The Rise of a New America, 626 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 192, 193 (2009). 
 205 See Infranca, supra note 21, at 58. 
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increased density.206 These units can make housing more affordable for exist-
ing residents by providing a property owner with income to maintain the pri-
mary residence, sustain a mortgage, or pay rising property taxes.207 ADUs may 
also enable moderate-income households to live in higher opportunity single-
family neighborhoods, neighborhoods that may have few rentals and where 
housing prices may be too high for ownership to be a realistic option.208 
Even in jurisdictions that permit ADUs, property owners who wish to 
build one often confront a myriad of regulatory and financial barriers. These 
include regulations that prohibit an ADU on lots below a certain size or set a 
maximum unit size that is too small for the ADU to provide a viable housing 
option.209 Other regulatory challenges include building separation and setback 
requirements and parking requirements (which collectively can make it impos-
sible to situate a unit on a lot); requirements that the property owner live on 
site or that the unit be rented to a relative; and costly permitting processes and 
required fees.210 Navigating these regulations can prove daunting, especially 
for homeowners who are not professional developers. Moreover, building an 
ADU, especially one detached from the main house, can be quite expensive, 
particularly on a per-square-foot basis,211 and homeowners may find it difficult 
to obtain financing. Finally, ADUs frequently confront local opposition based 
on the three-legged stool of NIMBYism: concerns about increased density, a 
shortage of parking, and a change in neighborhood character.212 
                                                                                                                           
 206 In the words of one developer, ADUs “can be a great, low impact way to bring new ‘stealth den-
sity’ into existing neighborhoods.” Bryn Davidson, How Cities Get ‘Granny Flats’ Wrong, CITYLAB 
(Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/design/2017/11/how-cities-get-granny-flats-wrong/546392/ 
[https://perma.cc/GY83-73A8]. 
 207 See Kathleen Pender, New California Housing Laws Make Granny Units Easier to Build, S.F. 
CHRON. (Dec. 3, 2016), https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/New-California-housing-laws-
make-granny-units-10688483.php [https://perma.cc/S4GH-72W3] (discussing potential benefits for 
homeowners); see also Infranca, supra note 21, at 65. 
 208 See Keith Ihlanfeldt & Tom Mayock, Affordable Housing and the Socioeconomic Integration of 
Elementary Schools (July 9, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2838401 (find-
ing, based on a study of the housing market in Florida, that an increase in the stock of affordable housing 
units in middle- and high-income neighborhoods can have an effect on the number of low-income stu-
dents in local schools). Ihlanfeldt and Mayock do not discuss ADUs specifically, but they find that mo-
bile homes and apartments are particularly likely to make a difference. Id. at 25. 
 209 See Infranca, supra note 21, at 70–85 (discussing regulatory and other barriers to ADU devel-
opment). 
 210 Id. 
 211 See KAREN CHAPPLE ET AL., S.F. URBAN LAND INST., JUMPSTARTING THE MARKET FOR 
ACCESSORY DWELLING UNITS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM PORTLAND, SEATTLE AND VANCOUVER 16, 
http://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/uploads/ADU_report_4.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/P253-447J] (finding 
an average cost of $156,000 based on a sample of 192 ADUs in Portland, Seattle, and Vancouver). 
 212 See, e.g., Katie McKellar, Salt Lake City Pumps Brakes on Mother-in-law Apartments, OKs 
$17.6M Plan for Affordable Housing, DESERET NEWS (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.deseretnews.com/
article/900005220/salt-lake-city-pumps-brakes-on-mother-in-law-apartments-oks-dollar176m-plan-for-
affordable-housing.html [https://perma.cc/G9DR-34TH] (discussing fears of Salt Lake City resident that 
ADUs “would cause issues in single-family neighborhoods”). The studies that have been done of ADUs 
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Some municipalities have taken steps to loosen regulatory restrictions, 
while others offer revolving loan funds to homeowners or provide other forms 
of assistance to encourage development.213 Portland, Oregon has recently taken 
the lead in ADU development in the United States.214 The city initially sought 
to encourage construction by eliminating the requirements of dedicated off-
street parking and that owners live on the property. These initial efforts had 
minimal effect on the pace of development.215 The City Council subsequently 
agreed to waive systems development charges, and the fee waiver, which can 
save homeowners up to $16,000, was later made permanent.216 After Portland 
waived these charges it saw a significant and steady increase in the number of 
ADUs built.217 In 2016, 615 new ADUs were permitted, up from 86 in 2010.218 
In December 2015, the City eliminated the setback requirement for ADUs and 
loosened design restrictions that required the ADU resemble the main house, 
making it easier for homeowners to add a “pre-fab[ricated]” ADU and poten-
tially cutting costs.219 
The level of demand in Portland has even given rise to a local startup that 
will install a prefabricated ADU at no cost, with the company retaining owner-
                                                                                                                           
suggest these concerns are unfounded. See CITY OF SEATTLE, ACCESSORY DWELLING UNITS: DRAFT 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 1–11 (2018), http://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/
Council/ADU_DEIS_2018.pdf (finding that a proposal to liberalize ADU laws would have no significant 
adverse impacts on building and population density, parking, public services, and utilities). 
 213 See Infranca, supra note 21, at 54; Margaret Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, A Room of One’s 
Own? Accessory Dwelling Unit Reforms and Local Parochialism, 45 THE URB. LAW. 519, 535–38 
(2013) (discussing local and state efforts to enable or encourage ADU development). 
 214 Laura Bliss, Portland’s ‘Granny Flats’ Get an Affordable Boost, CITYLAB (Mar. 12, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/03/portlands-granny-flats-get-an-affordable-boost/555083/ [https://
perma.cc/AZY9-8GDN] (reporting that “Portland has set about creating the most ADU-friendly policies 
in the country”). 
 215 Bob Young, Big Interest in Little Backyard Houses: Will Seattle Ease the Rules?, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2015), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/city-rules-among-big-
obstacles-for-little-houses/ [ttps://perma.cc/BG6U-LEKS]. 
 216 Portland City Council, Resolution No. Substitute 37353 (adopted May 2, 2018), https://www.
portlandoregon.gov/auditor/article/682997 [https://perma.cc/YJ2N-QQ58]; see also Steve Law, Fee 
Waiver for New Accessory Dwelling Units Fixed into Law, but There’s a Fee to Get It, PORTLAND TRIB. 
(June 27, 2018), https://pamplinmedia.com/sl/399497-294774-fee-waiver-for-new-accessory-dwelling-
units-fixed-into-law-but-theres-a-fee-to-get-it [https://perma.cc/9LZ3-BWAC] (noting that homeowners 
must pay a $400 fee to receive a waiver of system development charges and must enter into a restric-
tive covenant specifying they will not use the unit for short-term rentals for 10 years). 
 217 See Kim Moore, By the Numbers: Portland’s Residential Housing Boom, OR. BUS. (Nov. 14, 
2017), https://www.oregonbusiness.com/article/real-estate/item/18092-by-the-numbers-portlands-
residential-housing-boom [https://perma.cc/8SR6-C2KD]. 
 218 The Ascent of ADUs in Portland, ACCESSORYDWELLINGS.ORG (Feb. 27, 2017), https://
accessorydwellings.org/2017/02/27/the-ascension-of-adus-in-portland/ [https://perma.cc/T4RC-JK9X]. 
In 2016, the city also issued 957 permits for single-family dwellings and permits for 4,194 multi-
family units. Law, supra note 216. 
 219 Steve Law, Portland Makes It Easier to Site and Design Granny Flats, PORTLAND TRIB. (Dec. 
2, 2015), http://www.pamplinmedia.com/pt/9-news/283838-160384-portland-makes-it-easier-to-site-
and-design-granny-flats [https://perma.cc/4VEE-JHKY]. 
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ship, renting the unit out (with a percentage of rent paid to the homeowner), 
and then transferring ownership to the property owner after twenty-five 
years.220 In addition, Multnomah County, which includes Portland, instituted a 
pilot program that placed a small ADU in the backyards of four homeowners 
on condition that they provide the space to a currently homeless family for five 
years.221 After five years, homeowners would have the opportunity to purchase 
the ADU from the county.222 
Portland’s success in increasing ADU production provides a model for 
other municipalities with regards to the specific policies most likely to encour-
age ADU development. Still, many municipalities remain resistant to ADUs, 
fearing their effect on neighborhood character, among other concerns. Partly in 
response, a number of states have required that local governments permit the 
as-of-right construction of ADUs. The next subsection examines these legal 
developments and situates them within the context of the broader trend of state 
land use interventions. 
2. State Efforts to Encourage ADU Development 
a. California 
California passed a series of laws, over the past two decades, to ease local 
restrictions on ADUs. In 2002 the state passed legislation requiring local gov-
ernments to impose a “ministerial” review process for ADUs (termed “second 
units”), which would “apply predictable, objective, fixed, quantifiable and 
clear standards.”223 Subsequent research by Nicole Garnett and Margaret 
                                                                                                                           
 220 Steve Law, ADUs Out of Your Price Range? Think Again, PORTLAND TRIB. (June 5, 2018), 
https://portlandtribune.com/pt/9-news/397505-290432-adus-out-of-your-price-range-think-again [https://
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sized ADUs. Id.; see also Our ADUs, DWELLER, http://www.dweller.com/adus [https://perma.cc/9359-
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 221 Janet Eastman, ‘Backdoor Revolution:’ Little Houses Are Coming to Your Street, THE OREGO-
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https://www.koin.com/news/civic-affairs/portland-s-backyard-adu-program-quietly-launches/142601
6381 [https://perma.cc/C59H-4MUB]. 
 223 See Memorandum from Cathy E. Creswell, Deputy Dir., Div. of Hous. Pol’y Dev., Cal. Dep’t of 
Hous. & Cmty. Dev. to Planning Directors and Interested Parties 4–5 (Aug. 6, 2003), http://www.hcd.
ca.gov/community-development/housing-element/housing-element-memos/docs/hpd-memo-ab1866.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2CBK-X9YV] (noting that these standards “must be administratively applied to the 
application and not subject to discretionary decision-making by a legislative body . . . .”); see also CAL 
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Brinig, examining local implementation of the 2002 law, raised questions re-
garding its effectiveness.224 Their analysis suggested that the “seeming deregu-
latory success story masks hidden barriers that dramatically suppress the num-
ber of ADUs constructed and the value of ADUs as a means of increasing af-
fordable housing options.”225 These barriers were often imposed by local gov-
ernments in response to political pressure.226 
In an effort to strengthen the earlier legislation (and address locally-
imposed roadblocks), the California legislature passed two new laws in 2016, 
Senate Bill 1069227 and Assembly Bill 2299.228 These laws, which replace the 
term “second unit” with “accessory dwelling unit,”229 impose more specific 
limitations on the extent to which localities may regulate ADUs. 230 Although 
they are allowed to enact limited restrictions, local governments must approve, 
through a ministerial process, one ADU “per single-family lot if the unit is 
contained within the existing space of a single-family residence or accessory 
structure, has independent exterior access from the existing residence, and the 
side and rear setbacks are sufficient for fire safety.”231 Although municipalities 
may impose minimum and maximum unit sizes and size restrictions based up-
on a percentage of the existing dwelling on a lot, they must allow for at least 
“an efficiency unit to be constructed in compliance with local development 
standards.”232 Each community also must designate areas within their bounda-
                                                                                                                           
GOV’T CODE § 65852.150 (West 2013); id. § 65852.2 (West 2018). See generally Jane Cho, Second 
Units in the Silicon Valley, 48 URB. LAW. 459, 461 (2016) (discussing the 2002 law). 
 224 See Brinig & Garnett, supra note 213, at 541–45. 
 225 Id. at 523. 
 226 Local governments “responded to local political pressures by delaying the enactment of ADU 
legislation (and, in a few cases, simply refusing to do so despite the state mandate), imposing burden-
some procedural requirements that are contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the state-law requirement 
that ADUs be permitted ‘as of right,’ requiring multiple off-street parking spaces, and imposing substan-
tive and procedural design requirements.” Id. at 523–24; see also Jason Islas, Santa Monica Lawmaker 
Takes Aim at California’s Housing Shortage, STREETSBLOG (Mar. 16, 2016), https://cal.streetsblog.
org/2016/03/16/santa-monica-lawmaker-takes-aim-at-californias-housing-shortage/ [https://perma.cc/
4HHZ-PMYG] (contending that, despite the 2002 state law, “local jurisdictions have been able to impose 
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pensive”). 
 227 S.B. 1069, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016). 
 228 A.B. 2299, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016). 
 229 They defined an ADU as: “[A]n attached or a detached residential dwelling unit which pro-
vides complete independent living facilities for one or more persons. It shall include permanent provi-
sions for living, sleeping, eating, cooking, and sanitation on the same parcel as the single-family 
dwelling is situated.” Cal. S.B. 1069 § 5. 
 230 See Pender, supra note 207 (“About two-thirds of California’s cities and counties have their 
own second-unit ordinances, but the state law is more permissive than most of them. Jurisdictions that 
have not adopted or amended a local ordinance that complies with the new state law by Jan. 1 will 
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 231 Cal. S.B. 1069 (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65852.2(f)) (emphasis added). 
 232 Id. (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65852.2(c)). An efficiency unit, as defined in § 17958.1 
of the California Health and Safety Code, must “have a minimum floor area of 150 square feet.” Mu-
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ries where detached accessory dwellings located within a newly constructed 
structure (such as a backyard cottage) are allowed.233 If a municipality fails to 
adopt its own ordinance, default standards govern; permitting ADUs up to 
1,200 square feet in size (but not more than fifty percent of the existing living 
area on a lot), on any lots lot zoned for single-family or multi-family use and 
containing a single-family dwelling.234 
The law significantly limits the ability of local governments to impose 
off-street parking requirements, which can drive up the cost of constructing an 
ADU or make it difficult to situate the unit on a lot. Local governments may 
not require more than one parking space per unit or per bedroom and those 
spaces may be provided in the form of tandem parking, which is significantly 
easier to situate on many lots.235 Municipalities are expressly forbidden from 
requiring any parking for an ADU that is located within one half-mile of public 
transit or one block from a car share vehicle, part of the existing primary resi-
dence or an existing accessory structure, located in a historic district, or if on-
street parking permits are required but not offered to the occupant of the 
ADU.236 Collectively the state requires a local government to allow any single-
family homeowner to add an ADU—without additional off-street parking—if 
it is placed within the primary residence or an existing accessory building on 
the property. 
Although the courts have not yet interpreted the scope of local discretion 
to impose restrictions, the legislative findings for S.B. 1069 reveal a desire to 
significantly limit this local discretion, expressing the Legislature’s intent to 
prevent local government from imposing “arbitrary, excessive, or burdensome” 
restrictions on the ability of homeowners to add an ADU.237 A memorandum 
from the California Department of Housing and Community Development re-
inforces this point, noting that local governments may impose standards with 
regards to parking, lot coverage and size, maximum unit size, and height, but 
that “standards and allowable areas must not be designed or applied in a man-
                                                                                                                           
nicipalities are also free to impose standards “that include, but are not limited to, parking, height, 
setback, lot coverage, architectural review, maximum size of a unit, and standards that prevent adverse 
impacts on any real property that is listed in the California Register of Historic Places.” Id. (codified 
at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65852.2(a)(1)(B)). They also retain discretion to require that the property 
owner live on the property and that rentals be limited to terms of 30 days or longer—a potential mech-
anism for banning short-term rentals of an ADU via sites such as Airbnb. Id. (codified at CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 65852.2(b)(3)). 
 233 Id. (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65852.2(a)(1)(A)). In designating such areas, a local gov-
ernment can consider criteria “that may include, but are not limited to, the adequacy of water and 
sewer services and the impact of accessory dwelling units on traffic flow and public safety.” Id.; see 
also infra notes 245–246 and accompanying text (discussing proposed changes to this provision). 
 234 Id. (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65852.2(a)(D)(iv)). 
 235 Id. (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65852.2(d)). 
 236 Id. (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65852.2(e)). 
 237 Cal. S.B. 1069. 
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ner that burdens the development of ADUs and should maximize the potential 
for ADU development.”238 
The City of Pasadena’s recent zoning amendments related to ADUs reveal 
how one jurisdiction has interpreted its obligations under state law. A 2017 
staff report by the city’s Planning & Community Development Department 
recommended reducing the minimum lot size required for development of a 
detached or exterior ADU from 15,000 square feet to 7,200 square feet, the 
minimum lot size for single-family residential properties in the city’s RS-6 
zoning district.239 The department first analyzed the effect of a reduction to a 
10,000 square-foot minimum, but concluded that because only thirty-four per-
cent of residentially zoned properties in the city satisfied that minimum size it 
would not be consistent with the state law’s intent to encourage ADU devel-
opment. Noting that, in contrast, seventy-three percent of residentially-zoned 
properties are 7,200 square feet or larger, the report concluded that setting the 
minimum at this level “would provide sufficient opportunity for homeowners 
to construct Exterior Accessory Dwelling units.”240 The 7,000 square foot min-
imum lot size was subsequently approved unanimously by the Pasadena City 
Council.241 
In the short time since the 2016 laws took effect, the state has taken addi-
tional steps to further ease development and reduce or prohibit local fees. This 
includes a 2017 law, which clarified that an ADU shall not be considered a 
new residential use for the purposes of sewer and water connection fees and 
capacity charges.242 In January 2018, Senator Bob Wieckowski, sponsor of the 
earlier ADU laws, introduced Senate Bill 831, which would have further cut 
fees on accessory dwelling units, prohibiting impact fees, connection fees and 
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629T-A9LG]. 
 239 PLANNING COMM’N, CITY OF PASADENA, ZONING CODE AMENDMENTS: ACCESSORY DWELL-
ING UNITS 6 (2017), https://ww5.cityofpasadena.net/wp-content/uploads/sites/28/2017/05/2017-05-
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second water meters.243 The bill, which ultimately died in committee, would 
have further constrained local discretion.244 The state’s current ADU law de-
clares that a local ordinance shall: 
[d]esignate areas within the jurisdiction of the local agency where 
accessory dwelling units may be permitted. The designation of areas 
may be based on criteria, that may include, but are not limited to, the 
adequacy of water and sewer services and the impact of accessory 
dwelling units on traffic flow and public safety.245 
S.B. 831 would have amended this language, requiring a local ordinance to 
instead: 
[d]esignate areas within the jurisdiction of the local agency where 
accessory dwelling units may be excluded for health and safety, in-
cluding fire safety, purposes, based on clear findings that are sup-
ported by substantial evidence. The designation of areas shall be 
based on criteria that may include, but are not limited to, the ade-
quacy of water and sewer services and other health and safety, in-
cluding fire safety, issues.246 
In addition to a shift towards a presumption that ADUs are permitted unless 
expressly excluded, the failed bill required findings “supported by substantial 
evidence” and eliminates reference to “traffic flow” as a specified criterion. 
Among other changes, S.B. 831 also would have prohibited local governments 
from imposing a minimum lot size requirement, a maximum ADU unit size of 
less than eight hundred square feet (up significantly from 150 square feet un-
der current law), or a requirement of owner occupancy of the primary unit or 
the ADU.247 Finally, it would have created an amnesty program providing 
homeowners with an existing, but unpermitted, ADU up to ten years to make it 
compliant.248 Although S.B. 831 failed, its primary sponsor expressed plans to 
return with a similar bill in the next year. Separate legislation, Senate Bill 
                                                                                                                           
 243 Jondi Gumz, Santa Cruz County ADU Rules to Be Reconsidered, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL 
(Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.santacruzsentinel.com/2018/01/10/santa-cruz-county-adu-rules-to-be-
reconsidered/ [https://perma.cc/G4T3-32RM]; see S.B. 831, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 244 See Katy Murphy, Granny Flats: More Popular Than Ever, but Still Mired in Bureaucracy, 
MERCURY NEWS (July 12, 2018), https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/07/11/granny-flats-more-
popular-than-ever-but-still-mired-in-bureaucracy/ [https://perma.cc/Q4YR-3D24] (declaring the bill’s 
failure “a victory for cities and counties that protested the proposal as yet another Sacramento attack 
on local control”). 
 245 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65852.2(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
 246 Cal. S.B. 831 (emphasis added). 
 247 See id. 
 248 Id. See generally Jake Wegmann & Sarah Mawhorter, Measuring Informal Housing Produc-
tion in California Cities, 83 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 119 (2017) (analyzing the prevalence of unpermitted 
housing in California). 
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1226, will take effect at the start of 2019 and allows for the permitting of exist-
ing unpermitted ADUs based on the codes in effect at the time the unit was 
constructed.249 
The reforms in California quickly led to a significant increase in ADU 
applications and permits, as detailed in a 2017 report by the Terner Center at 
the University of California at Berkeley. 250 Oakland received 247 permit ap-
plications on the year through November 1, 2017, up from thirty-three in 
2015.251 The most dramatic increase was in Los Angeles, where the number of 
permits issued in 2017 was nearly twenty-five times the number in 2016.252 
ADU construction applications in Los Angeles rose to 1,980 on the year 
through November 1, 2017, from only eighty on 2016.253 It is unclear to what 
degree this increase in Los Angeles is attributable to new construction or to the 
legalization of existing units that were built without a permit.254 Nonetheless, 
the growth in ADU construction in California has been significant enough to 
create a niche business for architects and builders, akin to that developing in 
Portland, Oregon.255 In addition, recognizing the interest in ADUs, the Los 
                                                                                                                           
 249 S.B. 1226, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 17958.12). Other legislation pending as of October 2018 would shorten the amount of time 
local governments have to consider ADU permits and would prohibit minimum unit sizes of less than 
eight hundred square feet and minimum-lot-size requirements. See A.B. 2890, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 250 David Garcia, ADU Update: Early Lessons and Impacts of California’s State and Local Policy 
Changes, TERNER CTR. FOR HOUS. INNOVATION AT U.C. BERKELEY (Dec. 21, 2017), https://
ternercenter.berkeley.edu/blog/adu-update-early-lessons-and-impacts-of-californias-state-and-local-
policy [https://perma.cc/8HDZ-LV9F]. 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. 
 253 See Garcia, supra note 250; see also Josh Cohen, California ADU Applications Skyrocket After 
Regulatory Reform, NEXT CITY (Jan. 4, 2018), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/california-adu-
applications-skyrocket-after-regulatory-reform [https://perma.cc/G6PT-ECKT]; Virginia Postrel, Cali-
fornia Turns to Homeowners to Help Solve a Crisis, BLOOMBERG (May 21, 2018), https://www.
bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-05-21/california-turns-to-homeowners-to-solve-its-housing-crisis 
[https://perma.cc/TG44-HKE4] (finding that “[t]he city of Los Angeles issued 1,684 ADU permits in 
2017, compared with just 80 the previous year”). 
 254 Andrew Khouri, Could Granny Flats Help Ease the State’s Housing Crisis? Some Advocates 
Think So, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-backyard-homes-
20180413-story.html [https://perma.cc/T5HU-UXQL]. According to the Los Angeles Times, the num-
ber of ADU permits issued in Los Angeles rose from 120 in 2016 to 2,342 in 2017. Id. Granny flats is 
another term used for ADUs. See Elijah Chiland, LA County Will Pay Homeowners to Build Granny 
Flats for the Homeless, CURBED (Aug, 16, 2017), https://la.curbed.com/2017/8/16/16157282/los-
angeles-homeless-housing-accessory-dwelling-granny-flat [https://perma.cc/PP3G-KURR]. 
 255 See Khouri, supra note 254; Josie Huang, Popular Granny Flats Create a Niche Industry in LA, 
89.3 KPCC (Dec. 25, 2017), http://www.scpr.org/news/2017/12/25/79179/la-embracing-granny-flats-
more-than-anywhere-else/ [https://perma.cc/AQB2-3APB]; see, e.g., COVER, https://www.cover.build/ 
[https://perma.cc/B286-NTNN] (providing an online portal where homeowners can enter an address and 
determine whether an ADU is permitted on the property). Cover also builds and installs prefabricated 
ADUs. Id. A similar company operates in Palo Alto. See About, ADU BUILDER, INC., https://www.adu-
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Angeles County Board of Supervisors approved a pilot program that would 
enable homeowners seeking to develop an ADU on their property to receive up 
to $75,000 in funding as well as an expedited permitting process, in exchange 
for renting the unit to a formerly homeless individual.256 The City of Los An-
geles also received funding from Bloomberg Philanthropies to provide finan-
cial assistance to homeowners willing to add an ADU that would be rented to a 
formerly homeless individual.257 J.P. Morgan Chase also introduced its own 
pilot program to offer homeowners a low-cost loan for ADU development if 
they agree to rent the unit to low- and middle-income individuals.258 
Significant obstacles do remain in some jurisdictions, including lengthy 
permitting processes and significant fees, which sometimes do not comply 
with the new state laws.259 At the same time, some cities have pursued local 
regulations that go further than the state law in allowing ADU development. 
For example, in Newport Beach, California, the city Planning Commission 
recommended allowing both detached and attached ADUs at single-family 
homes in any residential zoning district.260 
In the course of just three years California has steadily and increasingly 
displaced local authority to regulate ADUs and to impose fees on their develop-
ment. This reflects in part an iterative process through which state lawmakers 
have sought to address individual obstacles to development as they become more 
salient.261 It also suggests that, in the absence of any significant revolt against the 
                                                                                                                           
builder.com/about [https://perma.cc/MQ44-4CGK] (stating that ADU Builder is a real-estate develop-
ment company in Palo Alto that aids with the financing, construction, and rental of ADUs). 
 256 Chiland, supra note 254; see also Memorandum from Richard J. Bruncker, Dir., L.A. Cty. 
Dep’t of Reg’l Planning, on Recommendation to Approve Second Dwelling Unit Pilot Project Under 
Homeless Initiative Strategy F4 to The Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles 4 (Aug. 
15, 2017), https://cbsla.files.wordpress.com/2017/08/dwell.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q47L-KUAE]. The 
Pilot Project has a modest amount of funding, sufficient for at most 2–3 new ADUs and the preserva-
tion of an additional 2–3 existing unpermitted ADUs. See id. 
 257 Elijah Chiland, Could ADUs Help Solve LA’s Homelessness Crisis?, CURBED (Oct. 29, 2018), 
https://la.curbed.com/2018/10/29/17485508/adu-homelessness-los-angeles-affordable-housing [https://
perma.cc/G9H6-JQUF]. 
 258 Richard Scheinin, Bank Funds ‘Granny’ Units Project in Affordable Housing Experiment for San 
Jose, L.A., MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/10/09/an-affordable-
housing-experiment-for-san-jose-and-los-angeles-bank-funds-pilot-project-to-help-build-granny-units/ 
[https://perma.cc/V63G-7TG3]. 
 259 See Murphy, supra note 244. 
 260 See Hillary Davis, Newport May Expand the Reach of ‘Granny Flats,’ L.A. TIMES (Aug. 10, 
2018), https://www.latimes.com/socal/daily-pilot/news/tn-dpt-me-adu-zoning-20180810-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/RC7W-KLTY] (“The Newport amendment would take the recent state zoning up-
date a step further by allowing the units to accompany single-family houses as unattached dwellings 
or as attached units with a separate exterior entrance, also in any residential district.”). 
 261 See Louis Hansen, Building a Bay Area Granny Flat Still Challenging, MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 
18, 2019), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/01/17/building-a-bay-area-granny-flat-still-challenging/ 
[https://perma.cc/9ZED-PBAB] (discussing plans by the author of the original ADU law to introduce 
further legislation to reduce local restrictions and fees). 
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state’s actions to ease ADU development, in part by curtailing local authority, 
state lawmakers have felt empowered to take increasingly intrusive steps. 
b. Oregon 
California’s neighbor to the north has also taken steps to push ADU de-
velopment at the state level. Senate Bill 1051, which took effect on July 1, 
2018, declares that “[a] city with a population greater than 2,500 or a county 
with a population greater than 15,000 shall allow in areas zoned for detached 
single-family dwellings the development of at least one accessory dwelling 
unit for each detached single-family dwelling, subject to reasonable local regu-
lations relating to siting and design.”262 Oregon goes further than California in 
that the basic definition of an ADU includes a detached structure or backyard 
cottage and not just an ADU within the primary dwelling.263 Subsequent guid-
ance issued by the Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Develop-
ment encourages local governments to allow two ADUs on a property, avoid 
any minimum lot size requirements, and not impose parking or owner-
occupancy requirements.264 The Oregon legislature initially considered, but 
ultimately rejected, a separate bill during the same session that would have 
prevented any city or county from prohibiting not only ADUs, but also a du-
plex on any single-family lot.265 
c. Washington 
Moving up the coast (and back in time), Washington State’s 1993 Hous-
ing Policy Act included a provision requiring cities and counties above a cer-
tain population to adopt ordinances that encourage ADU development in sin-
                                                                                                                           
 262 S.B. 1051, 79th Cong., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2017). 
 263 Id. (declaring that “accessory dwelling unit” means an interior, attached or detached residen-
tial structure that is used in connection with or that is accessory to a single-family dwelling”). 
 264 OREGON DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., GUIDANCE ON IMPLEMENTING THE ACCES-
SORY DWELLING UNITS (ADU) REQUIREMENT UNDER OREGON SENATE BILL 1051, at 2–3 (2018), 
https://www.oregon.gov/lcd/Publications/ADU_Guidance_SB1051_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6PY-
6LCA]; see also Steve Law, New Law Could Pave Path for More ADUs, PORTLAND TRIB. (May 17, 
2018), https://pamplinmedia.com/sl/395683-289256-new-law-could-pave-path-for-more-adus [https://
perma.cc/4UBF-AYZ3] (noting that state land use agency’s model ADU code suggests allowing two 
ADUs per parcel). One community, the City of Tigard, which prohibited detached ADUs prior to the 
state legislation, is now considering a city task force’s recommendation to allow up to two ADUs on a 
property. Editorial Board, Track Accessory Dwelling Unit Law for Effectiveness, PORTLAND TRIB. (May 
23, 2018), https://pamplinmedia.com/fgnt/37-opinion/396302-289154-track-accessory-dwelling-unit-
law-for-effectiveness [https://perma.cc/BRU5-AKFZ]. 
 265 See supra note 168 and accompanying text; see also Kriston Capps, Oregon May Strip Portland 
of Its NIMBY Powers, CITYLAB (June 19, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/design/2017/06/oregons-hb-
2007-would-preempt-cities-zoning-rights/528612/ [https://perma.cc/CWM7-JSL5]. 
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gle-family zoning districts.266 The statute, which predates California’s first 
statewide ADU law, directs a state agency to develop “recommendations to the 
legislature designed to encourage the development and placement of accessory 
apartments in areas zoned for single-family residential use.”267 It mandates that 
local governments subject to the law incorporate these recommendations into 
their local regulations.268 However, “[t]o allow local flexibility, the recommen-
dations shall be subject to such regulations, conditions, procedures, and limita-
tions as determined by the local legislative authority.”269 This language leaves 
some uncertainty as to how much flexibility local officials possess.270 
Washington State’s law does not go as far as the more recent legislation in 
California and Oregon, which mandate that local governments allow ADUs to 
be developed as-of-right. Nonetheless, a significant number of communities in 
Washington do allow them.271 Researchers have attributed the broad adoption 
of local ADU ordinances to the fact that ADUs can assist municipalities in sat-
isfying the state’s Growth Management Act goals of encouraging affordable 
housing and providing for a variety of housing types.272 
d. Other States 
As of September 2005, Vermont requires that homeowners be allowed to 
add one ADU unit as a permitted use, so long as certain conditions are satis-
                                                                                                                           
 266 See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.63A.215 (1993); see also id. § 36.70A.400 (noting that Washing-
ton’s Housing Policy Act also requires cities and counties that plan under the State’s Growth Man-
agement Act to adopt ordinances that encourage ADU development in single-family zoning); Acces-
sory Dwelling Units, MUN. RESEARCH & SERVS. CTR. OF WASH., http://mrsc.org/Home/Explore-
Topics/Planning/General-Planning-and-Growth-Management/Accessory-Dwelling-Units-in-Plain-
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include consideration of accessory dwelling units. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-196-410(2)(f)(i)(A) 
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 267 See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.63A.215(1)(b). 
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 269 Id. 
 270 See Accessory Dwelling Units, supra note 266 (explaining how “[i]t is still unclear how far cities 
may depart from [the state Department of Community, Trade, and Economic Development’s] recom-
mendations and remain in compliance with the intent of the Act”). The Department of Community, 
Trade, and Economic Development issued a model ADU ordinance in January 1994. See generally 
WASH. STATE DEP’T OF CMTY., TRADE, AND ECON. DEV., MODEL ACCESSORY DWELLING UNIT ORDI-
NANCE RECOMMENDATIONS (1994), http://mrsc.org/getmedia/3ccc6c5e-0cc9-43c1-8936-b0017c7c161e/
ADUordrecommendations.pdf.aspx [https://perma.cc/UE3K-9D59]. 
 271 See Accessory Dwelling Units, supra note 266. 
 272 See id. As this Article neared publication, legislators in Washington introduced ambitious new 
statewide ADU legislation. See Margaret Morales, Can Washington Pass the Country’s Most Ambitious 
Statewide ADU Reform?, SIGHTLINE INST. (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.sightline.org/2019/01/30/can-
washington-pass-the-countrys-most-ambitious-statewide-adu-reform/ [https://perma.cc/9APR-K52Q] 
(describing legislation as “the most progressive accessory dwelling unit (ADU) bill legislators from any 
state have ever had the opportunity to vote on”). 
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fied.273 These conditions include: (1) the property has “sufficient wastewater 
capacity,” (2) the ADU is no larger in size than thirty percent of the total habit-
able square footage of the house (municipalities remain free to adopt less re-
strictive laws permitting larger ADUs), and (3) the property satisfies applicable 
setback, coverage, and parking requirements in town zoning bylaws.274 
New Hampshire’s Senate Bill 146, which took effect on June 1, 2017,275 
requires municipal zoning ordinances to permit the development of one at-
tached ADU, either by right, special exception, or conditional use permit, in all 
districts that permit single-family residences.276 The law expressly links the 
mandate to allow ADUs to the state’s grant of zoning authority to municipali-
ties: “[a] municipality that adopts a zoning ordinance pursuant to the authority 
granted in this chapter shall allow accessory dwelling units . . . .”277 Although 
municipalities can establish minimum and maximum unit sizes for the ADU, 
they cannot restrict the size of any ADU to less than 750 square feet.278 The 
law is still quite new and as of February 2018 there had not been a significant 
surge in ADU construction in the Granite State.279 
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 274 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4412(1)(E)(1)(2)(3). 
 275 S.B. 146, Gen. Court, 2017 Sess. (codified in N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:72) (2017). See 
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 276 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:72. 
 277 Id. An “accessory dwelling unit” is defined as “a residential living unit that is within or at-
tached to a single-family dwelling, and that provides independent living facilities for one or more 
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the property, but may not require separate water and sewage systems or a familial relationship be-
tween the occupant of the primary dwelling and the ADU. Id. § 674:72. 
 278 Id. § 674:72. 
 279 David Brooks, Despite Ease in Guidelines, Officials See No Surge of New In-law Apartments, 
CONCORD MONITOR (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.concordmonitor.com/accessory-units-in-law-
apartments-nh-15216366 [https://perma.cc/Q8WP-TEMA]. The New Hampshire Municipal Associa-
tion drafted an explanation of the new state law and a proposed zoning amendment, which many local 
governments chose to adopt. See LEGAL SERVS. DEP’T, N.H. MUN. ASSOC., THE NEW LAW ON AC-
CESSORY DWELLING UNITS (Sept. 2016), https://www.nhmunicipal.org/Resources/ViewDocument/741 
[https://perma.cc/6SSY-JHVE]; David Brooks, Town Meeting Voters Tweak New Laws Allowing ‘In-law 
Apartments’ Across N.H., CONCORD MONITOR (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.concordmonitor.com/
accessory-unit-town-meeting-8692225 [https://perma.cc/CCU3-GG8P]. 
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Other states, while taking less significant steps, have recognized the po-
tential for ADUs to ease housing shortages and affordability concerns and have 
sought to encourage ADU development.280 As of January 1, 2017, a state law 
in Rhode Island allows owner-occupants of single-family homes to build an 
ADU, within an existing structure, as-of-right for a relative age sixty-two or 
older.281 A 2004 Florida law enables, but does not require, local governments 
to adopt an ordinance permitting ADUs in any single-family residential zone, 
“[u]pon a finding . . . that there is a shortage of affordable rentals within its 
jurisdiction.”282 Should a local government adopt an ordinance pursuant to the 
law, the property owner seeking to develop an ADU must sign an affidavit stat-
ing “that the unit will be rented at an affordable rate to an extremely-low-
income, very-low-income, low-income, or moderate-income person or per-
sons.”283 To provide an incentive for localities to allow ADU development, the 
law states that ADUs “shall apply toward satisfying the affordable housing 
component of the housing element in the local government’s comprehensive 
plan . . . .”284 In addition, Florida allows property owners who add living quar-
ters for a parent or grandparent to obtain a reduction of their assessment for all 
or part of the value of the new construction.285 
3. A Drop in the Affordability Bucket or the Opening of a Spigot? 
State-level ADU laws that displace local regulations may have a signifi-
cant effect given the large percentage of land throughout the United States, 
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ANN. § 8-30g (West 2017). 
 285 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.703 (West 2013); Granny Flat Assessment Reduction, MIAMI-DADE 
PROP. APPRAISER, http://www.miamidade.gov/pa/exemptions_granny_flat.asp [https://perma.cc/WQW3-
V3YE]. 
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including in major cities, that is zoned single-family residential. In both Los 
Angeles and San Francisco, “well over three quarters of the total land area is 
comprised of neighborhoods where single-family homes make up at least 60% 
of the community’s housing stock.”286 In Seattle, 54% percent of the city’s 
land area is zoned single-family.287 Seattle’s Department of Planning and De-
velopment has estimated that if just 5% of eligible single-family homes added 
detached accessory dwelling units, it would provide about 4,000 additional 
dwellings in the city.288 According to the Bay Area Council in San Francisco, if 
10% of the 1.5 million single-family properties in the Bay Area added an ADU 
it would add 150,000 new units.289 Although this may appear unlikely, roughly 
one-quarter of owners in the Bay Area, according to a recent survey, stated that 
they would be open to adding an ADU.290 In Vancouver, British Columbia, 
which, in 2004, legalized ADUs within an existing house,291 more than one-
third of the city’s single-family homes now have an ADU.292 In addition, in 
2009, the city started to allow “laneway houses,” detached ADUs facing an 
alley, which rent for an average of approximately $1,250 a month.293 The city 
now has more than 2,000 laneway houses.294 
                                                                                                                           
 286 Garcia, supra note 250; see also BACKYARD HOMES LA 8 (Dana Cuff et al. eds., 2010) (“By 
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Absent the rezoning of single-family parcels and subsequent tear down of 
existing houses, ADUs provide the most plausible mechanism for increasing 
density and housing supply in these neighborhoods and thus in a significant 
portion of most major cities.295 As local residents become accustomed to a 
gradual increase in density, or see the potential financial benefits of being able 
to add an additional housing unit to their property, regulations allowing ADUs 
may, in time, lead to even more permissive regulations allowing for multiple 
ADUs, duplexes, and triplexes on single-family lots. This is particularly likely 
to occur if, as the limited evidence to date suggests, an influx of ADUs does 
not significantly alter neighborhood character, or does so in a fairly gradual 
and imperceptible manner.296 There has already been some movement in this 
direction within individual cities and some consideration of such reforms at the 
state level.297 
There is limited empirical research on the question of whether ADUs rent 
at more affordable levels than comparably sized housing units.298 ADUs may 
prove more affordable because owners make them available to family and 
friends at a discounted rent. One researcher, who studied accessory dwellings 
in Edmonton, Alberta, found that forty-eight percent of units were rented to 
family and friends, on average for lower rent than might otherwise be 
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charged.299 A survey of homeowners in Portland, Seattle, and Vancouver with 
an ADU on their property found “the majority of ADUs rent for below market 
rates whether rented at arm’s length or not . . . .”300 These and earlier studies 
suggest that ADUs may rent at more affordable levels than comparably-sized 
units.301 As the volume of ADUs in cities like Portland and Los Angeles in-
creases, researchers will be better positioned to determine the direct effects on 
affordability. In addition, a number of small pilot programs have been intro-
duced in recent years with the specific goal of developing detached accessory 
dwelling units that would be rented at affordable rates for a defined period of 
time.302 
Of equal importance, ADUs, which typically are built in existing single-
family neighborhoods, may provide low and moderate-income households 
with a more affordable housing option within particularly desirable neighbor-
hoods where smaller units would otherwise not be available.303 One key di-
mension of the broader housing crisis is the lack of affordable housing in high-
er opportunity neighborhoods: safer communities with stronger schools and 
better employment prospects.304 Researchers have found that “[m]etropolitan 
areas with suburbs that restrict the density of residential construction are more 
segregated on the basis of income than those with more permissive density 
zoning regimes.”305 The 2016 White House Housing Toolkit emphasized that 
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ADUs can “expand the available rental housing stock in areas zoned largely 
for single-family housing” and thereby promote “healthy, responsive, afforda-
ble, high-opportunity housing markets . . . .”306 Along these lines, a number of 
municipalities identified ADUs as a mechanism for providing fair housing—
and access to opportunity—in documents that local governments, until recent-
ly, were required to file with HUD pursuant to their legal obligation to “affirm-
atively further fair housing.”307 The likelihood of ADUs providing housing 
options for lower-income households in more desirable neighborhoods may be 
limited to the extent that ADUs are rented to family or through informal social 
networks and by the fact that the Fair Housing Act’s prohibition on discrimina-
tion would not apply to ADU rentals (although local fair housing laws may 
apply).308 It is possible that in the growing number of jurisdictions that provide 
homeowners with financial assistance for developing an ADU, in exchange for 
a commitment to rent the unit to a lower-income household, regulations pro-
hibiting discrimination might be imposed on such rentals. However, such pro-
grams have, to date, been quite small in size given funding limitations. In sum, 
while ADUs may play some part in directly promoting more affordable hous-
ing options, particularly in more desirable neighborhoods, this should not be 
overstated. Rather the most significant effect that more liberal ADU laws are 
likely to have on housing affordability is as one component of a broader effort 
to expand housing supply. 
Finally, even where state and local laws liberalize ADU regulations, 
homeowners may be barred from developing an ADU by a homeowners asso-
ciation.309 This issue has not received significant attention in states that have 
liberalized ADU laws. Some authorities assume that a state ADU law would 
apply only to local governments and not override private agreements such as a 
homeowner’s associations’ covenants.310 However, it is possible that—in light 
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of a strong state interest in encouraging housing development in the form of 
ADUs—a court might strike a covenant for public policy reasons or a legisla-
ture might pass a statute prohibiting covenants that restrict ADUs. 
IV. A NOT-SO-QUIET REVOLUTION 
By stymieing new housing development, overly restrictive local zoning 
has exacerbated the housing crisis in communities throughout the United 
States. The significant negative externalities generated by these limits on new 
housing supply and the persistence of local resistance to new development jus-
tify bold new state land use interventions. A similar call for state intervention 
was made in the 1970s, and while it gave rise to Massachusetts’s Chapter 40B, 
Mount Laurel, and California’s Housing Element law, the impact of these in-
terventions remains limited. This Part delineates what is different about the 
current set of state interventions and the context in which they have arisen. It 
then argues that going forward such interventions should be targeted at 
preempting specific elements of local zoning, while also providing some 
mechanisms for addressing countervailing concerns. 
A. From Channeling to Displacing Local Discretion 
Comparing recent state-level land use and housing interventions with 
those of the 1970s reveals a few substantive distinctions. To varying degrees 
the earlier set of programs, which emphasized planning and procedural re-
forms, focused on channeling local discretion. These procedures sought to en-
sure the distribution of affordable housing across municipalities, based on ei-
ther a set percentage of total housing in a jurisdiction or some measure of its 
“fair share.” In the case of New Jersey and Massachusetts, they relied in part 
upon private enforcement through developers invoking a “builder’s reme-
dy.”311 
The interventions examined in Part III differ in two key ways.312 First, 
they expressly preempt or displace specific elements of local land use regula-
tion. This is true of laws mandating that local governments allow ADUs on any 
single-family lot, imposing restrictions on parking requirements at certain new 
developments, or specifying the “objective planning standards” that local gov-
ernments must consider when reviewing infill developments313 Massachu-
setts’s failed Great Neighborhoods Legislation would have required multi-
family zoning in some part of each community. California’s S.B. 827 would 
have gone even further, overriding local zoning in a significant portion of the 
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state. In each of these examples state standards are imposed in place of local 
regulations or local government discretion is carefully circumscribed. Alt-
hough some of these efforts have failed, they have also generated significant 
public attention, highlighting the role that restrictive zoning plays in reducing 
housing supply and driving up costs. 
Second, recent interventions tend to streamline local development ap-
proval processes, rather than add planning and procedural requirements or ad-
ditional layers of review. Chapter 40B’s comprehensive permit process also 
streamlined the approval of certain housing, but recent laws are broader in ap-
plication.314 Of course, in some cases these laws, such as those limiting the 
application of state environmental review, only serve to remove requirements 
previously imposed by the state. But in other cases, these laws demand quicker 
decisions by local governments or significantly limit the grounds upon which a 
local government can reject new development. 
Beyond these differences in how these two generations of state interven-
tions function and relate to local zoning, debates around these laws reveal 
changing political dynamics. In the remainder of this Part, I draw out these 
dynamics before arguing that they suggest we are in the early stages of a new 
movement towards greater state-level intervention in land use law generally 
and housing development in particular.315 
B. The (Increasingly Apparent) Costs of Low-Density Zoning 
William Fischel argued that suburban communities responded to the 
Mount Laurel decisions by seeking to thwart all new development in the name 
of “growth management.”316 This served not only to maintain low-density sub-
urban neighborhoods but also to keep out low-income housing and minority 
residents by simply allowing no new housing in the aftermath of Mount Laurel 
and Chapter 40B.317 The exclusion of any development was justified in part, 
during the 1970s, by environmental concerns and the desire to preserve open 
space.318 At the same time, state and federal environmental laws gave rise to a 
“double veto” that imposed additional obstacles for new development.319 
Fischel contends that homeowners worked with and within the environmental 
movement to add layers of review and stymie new development in their neigh-
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borhoods.320 Supporting this point, a California lawyer who compiled and 
studied two datasets of California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) litiga-
tion concluded that “CEQA has evolved into a legal tool most often used 
against the higher density urban housing, transit, and renewable energy pro-
jects, which are all critical components of California’s climate priorities and 
California’s ongoing efforts to remain a global leader on climate policy.”321 
In recent years, the positive effects of denser, transit-oriented develop-
ment have begun to play a more significant role in debates over land use, envi-
ronmental policy and housing development.322 Although California has not 
directly reformed CEQA, A.B. 73, discussed above, precludes project-specific 
CEQA lawsuits within designated housing sustainability districts.323 At the 
same time, there are growing tensions within the environmental community 
between older advocates, who may have championed the slow or no-growth 
initiatives that started in the 1970s, and newer advocates who emphasize dens-
er development and public transportation as, in part, a means of addressing 
climate change.324 This split played out in the debate over S.B. 827 in Califor-
nia, which the California chapter of the Sierra Club opposed on a number of 
grounds, including the potential side effect of less new transit development (as, 
they argued, outlying communities would resist new transit so as to avoid an 
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automatic upzoning under S.B. 827).325 This opposition “raised some eye-
brows, given the environmental impact of transit-oriented development.”326 
Although the Sierra Club’s opposition received significant attention, other en-
vironmental groups, including the Natural Resources Defense Council, Cli-
mate Resolve, and Environmental California, supported S.B. 827.327 
The embrace of denser and more transit-oriented development by younger 
environmentalists overlaps with the efforts of the burgeoning YIMBY move-
ment, which urges increased development primarily as a means to lower hous-
ing prices through increased supply.328 Survey data suggests an increasing 
preference more generally for denser living, particularly in recent years329 
among younger individuals.330 The confluence of these trends: a growing 
awareness of the environmental benefits of density, a preference for denser 
living, and an informed cohort of young professionals pushing for increased 
housing supply in urban areas, augurs growing support for interventions that 
displace restrictions on or create incentives for such development.331 
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It also marks an important contrast with Mount Laurel I and Chapter 40B, 
which focused narrowly on the availability of housing for low- and moderate-
income households, emphasizing the obligation of individual municipalities to 
meet this need.332 In Mount Laurel I the municipality defended its one-half 
acre minimum lot size in part on environmental grounds (specifically sewage 
and water supply).333 In the over forty decades since, public awareness of the 
broader costs of restrictive zoning for the environment and economic growth 
has increased significantly. The result is the potential for an increasing conver-
gence of interests among housing advocates, environmentalists, the business 
community, and young professionals across the political spectrum. Admittedly, 
there are obstacles to this convergence. YIMBYs face skepticism if not down-
right opposition from anti-gentrification activists.334 “Supply-skeptics” in the 
affordable housing community question the academic consensus that a greater 
supply of market rate housing will lead to more affordability.335 Yet even given 
these challenges the nature of the discourse has clearly changed, as has the 
breadth and depth of reforms receiving real consideration. 
C. Homeowners as Developers 
California’s Building Industry Association pushed for the state’s original 
1969 housing element law, persuading then-Assemblyman (and later Gover-
nor) Pete Wilson to address what it deemed excessive local regulation of land 
use and development and insufficient recognition of the costs of regulation.336 
Mount Laurel and Massachusetts’s 40B, which enable developers to appeal 
local rejections of a proposed development, are often criticized by local resi-
dents as nothing more than a gift to developers, delivered at the expense of 
local communities.337 These programs are also criticized on the grounds that by 
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usurping local control they reject local expertise and ignore the effects of new 
development. 
It is difficult for opponents to similarly criticize state laws mandating that 
local governments allow ADUs. Although property owners tend to prefer local 
control of land use issues, they also frequently find themselves frustrated by 
onerous requirements, delays, and outright rejections at the hands of local offi-
cials. Nonetheless, the League of California Cities, in a letter to Senator Bob 
Wieckowski, the chief sponsor of the state’s ADU legislation, criticized the 
new law’s removal of local control338 as have certain local officials.339 
Wieckowski responded by arguing that the statute serves the goal of “re-
turn[ing] [] power to the homeowner.”340 Local officials have voiced similar 
sentiments.341 
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Units from Granny Flats, CAMARILLO ACORN (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.thecamarilloacorn.com/
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These responses suggest an effort to undermine a traditional argument for 
local control—that the local government is closer to individual citizens and a 
better vehicle for channeling local preferences. In the case of ADUs, the argu-
ment goes, local governments have for too long prevented homeowners from 
using their property as they see fit. As Wieckowski contends: “If [a homeown-
er] decided they wanted to get rid of their garage and convert their unit, or 
build a unit over the garage, or convert their master bedroom into another unit, 
that’s their prerogative and if that’s how they want to live—why not?” 342 
For this reason, laws that enable the development of ADUs on single-
family lots add a layer of complexity to the traditional image of NIMBY 
homeowners who seek to exercise local control and stymie new develop-
ment.343 It is the very same homeowners who often desire to develop an ADU 
as a means of providing housing for a relative, downsizing and aging in 
place,344 or helping to pay rising property taxes and a mortgage.345 In this re-
spect, homeowners’ attitudes towards loosened regulation of ADUs may prove 
akin to the attitudes of urban workers towards new development during the 
period when most urban residents walked to work. As William Fischel ob-
served, those who live close to work are likely to have mixed feelings about 
new development as it may both disrupt their lives and provide new financial 
opportunities.346 It is possible that the increased prevalence of state laws man-
dating that local governments allow single-family homeowners to add an ADU 
may make those same homeowners, who yield significant power over zoning 
more generally, more open to broader reforms. 
                                                                                                                           
 342 Tanza Loudenback, Crazy-High Rent, Record-Low Homeownership and Overcrowding: Califor-
nia Has a Plan to Solve the Housing Crisis, But Not Without a Fight, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 12, 2017), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/granny-flat-law-solution-california-affordable-housing-shortage-2017-3 
[https://perma.cc/3EBE-9EMP]. 
 343 Cf. BACKYARD HOMES LA, supra note 286, at 5 (explaining that instead of large-scale devel-
opment, homeowners can slowly make their homes more affordable). 
 344 DEL. STATE HOUSING AUTH., ACCESSORY DWELLING UNITS: A PRACTICAL OPTION TO PRO-
MOTE AFFORDABILITY 1 (2010) (noting “movement for aging in place” as one indicator of “the need 
for accessory dwelling units”). 
 345 See Postrel, supra note 252 (discussing how ADUs provide multiple benefits for “the single-
family homeowners who drive the state’s housing policy”). 
 346 Fischel, supra note 316, at 327. Fischel explains: 
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rupts their home and business life, but it also provides opportunities for financial gain. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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D. Opening the Door to Further Reform 
Perhaps more importantly than their direct impact on housing supply and 
affordability, recent state laws permitting gentle density—both ADUs and oth-
er forms of infill development—may open the door to more significant reforms 
as residents become accustomed to greater density. At the city level, the suc-
cess of Portland’s ADU reforms in encouraging housing production throughout 
the city’s residential neighborhoods led directly to Portland’s Residential Infill 
Project, which initially proposed rezoning approximately forty percent of the 
city’s single-family neighborhoods to allow duplexes, triplexes, and multiple 
ADUs.347 In September 2018, Portland’s Planning and Sustainability Commis-
sion tentatively approved an even more radical policy, which would rezone 
ninety-six percent of the city’s single-family neighborhoods and permit “any 
combination of up to four homes on a single lot . . . .”348 The effort seeks to 
implement the city’s updated Comprehensive Plan, which calls for more “miss-
ing-middle housing.”349 Vancouver, British Columbia, which has allowed 
ADUs, termed “laneway homes,” on alleyways for a number of years, now 
allows laneway apartment buildings as tall as six stories.350 The Minneapolis 
City Council recently eliminated single-family zoning, allowing duplexes and 
triplexes in every neighborhood.351 The City Council President described the 
move to allow triplexes in single-family neighborhoods as an incremental 
change given the city’s previous legalization of ADUs.352 Similar efforts to 
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LAND, https://www.portlandoregon.gov/bps/67728 [https://perma.cc/7W75-JWMQ]. 
 350 Kevin Griffin, Small All-Rental Apartment Building Plans to Densify West End Vancouver 
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2018, at A12. 
 352 See Henry Grabar, Minneapolis Confronts Its History of Housing Segregation, SLATE (Dec. 7, 
2018), https://slate.com/business/2018/12/minneapolis-single-family-zoning-housing-racism.html [https://
perma.cc/9HGE-2EDS]. One city councilor also remarked that the plan’s approval was eased by the fact 
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gradually increase density in residential neighborhoods are underway in other 
cities.353 
These developments suggest that more permissive ADU laws, by enabling 
a gentle increase in density, might open the door to more significant changes 
and even greater increases in density and housing development.354 One might 
ask why state action is necessary and why homeowners who favor ADU de-
velopment have not pushed local officials to liberalize local ordinances. One 
possibility is that in any given jurisdiction, the number of homeowners inter-
ested in adding an ADU might be small and their interest in expending the en-
ergy necessary to lobby for a change in local laws might be insufficient.355 At 
the state level, a critical mass of support for ADUs is easier to achieve with 
support from affordable housing advocates, legislators concerned more gener-
ally with restrictions on housing production, national groups like the American 
Association of Retired Persons (AARP), and a burgeoning industry of busi-
nesses that design and install ADUs.356 AARP in particular has long advocated 
                                                                                                                           
that smaller single-family homes were being replaced by larger “McMansions” in certain neighborhoods. 
Id. The new plan will allow for up to three separate housing units in a building of the same size as these 
larger single-family homes. Id. The Chair of Seattle’s Planning Commission, which recently recom-
mended allowing more duplexes, triplexes, and fourplexes in single-family zones expressed a similar 
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you like your neighborhood? 
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Density, THE BULLETIN (May 2, 2018), https://www.bendbulletin.com/localstate/6207769-151/bend-
officials-wrestle-with-rules-to-boost-neighborhood [https://perma.cc/WH3V-GN2Y] (reporting discus-
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lots). 
 354 Cf. Grabar, supra note 352 (reporting that, according to Minneapolis City Council President, 
the move to allow triplexes in single-family neighborhoods was an incremental change given city’s 
previous legalization of ADUs). 
 355 There appears to be some effort to organize ADU owners in Los Angeles. See Loudenback, 
supra note 342 (discussing efforts of ADU owner in Los Angeles to establish an advocacy group for 
ADU landlords). 
 356 Anecdotally, there are indications that once state law allows ADU development, subject to 
some local regulation, homeowners will come out in support of minimal local restrictions. See Nick 
Welsh, Santa Barbara’s Granny Flat Avalanche, SANTA BARBARA INDEP. (Sept. 28, 2017), https://
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for ADUs, commissioning a report by the American Planning Association in 
2010 that included a model local ordinance and state act.357 The model state act 
establishes a state policy of encouraging ADUs, authorizes localities to adopt 
an ADU ordinance, and “sets the terms for what communities can and cannot 
do in regulating ADUs . . . .”358 The model state act would also require munic-
ipalities that choose to prohibit ADUs outright to provide findings to support 
this decision and receive certification from the state’s housing office that their 
ordinance conforms to the model act’s intentions.359 Although it had less im-
mediate effect at the state level, as the next section will detail, many of these 
elements are reflected in the recent spate of state-level ADU laws.360 
E. Positive Preemption? 
In the past few years, a number of scholars and commentators have cri-
tiqued trends along the lines of what Richard Briffault termed “the ‘new 
preemption’—sweeping state laws that clearly, intentionally, extensively, and 
at times punitively, bar local efforts to address a host of problems.”361 Such 
laws frequently seek to prohibit any regulation, rather than coordinate regula-
tion so as to address regional or state-wide concerns.362 Briffault’s new 
preemption would appear to not include the laws highlighted in this article, as 
he emphasizes laws that “frequently displace local action without replacing it 
with substantive state requirements.”363 The laws discussed in Part III364 in-
stead either limit the scope of acceptable local regulation in a particular area or 
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d17158_dwell.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5E9-P232]; Wendy Koch, In-law Units Help Homeowners Pay 
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 363 Id. at 1. 
 364 See infra notes 121–310 and accompanying text. 
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directly displace existing local regulation with a statewide standard.365 Nor do 
these laws reflect the anti-urbanism inclinations that, as Richard Schragger has 
noted, inform a significant portion of recent state preemption of local initia-
tives.366 Instead, as one commentator has argued, they might be framed as a 
positive example of state preemption invoked to confront local “anti-
development NIMBY interests” and address state-wide housing concerns.367 
At the same time, there are potential dangers in embracing state-level in-
tervention as a means to liberalize local zoning. As Schragger points out, a 
number of states have taken action to preempt local inclusionary zoning stat-
utes or affordable housing requirements.368 Such preemption may be justified, 
to the extent that a state can establish it addresses a negative externality and 
serves the general welfare. There are arguments and empirical evidence that 
certain forms of inclusionary zoning and affordable housing requirements can 
reduce overall development, restrict supply, and drive up costs.369 But that is 
not always true and while this Article calls for more significant state interven-
tion to confront restrictive local zoning, it does not contend that all land use 
regulation should occur at the state level. 
In the case of local zoning that restricts housing supply to levels well be-
low demand, the evidence is clear that such regulations drive up costs and that 
most cities are not moving to liberalize local zoning.370 Given these realities, 
state governments are justified in preempting overly restrictive local zoning. 
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 369 See generally Schuetz et al., supra note 138 (examining how certain forms of inclusionary 
zoning can deter new development and reduce housing supply). 
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cities of San Jose, Santa Clara, and Sunnyvale and finding that allowable residential densities in-
creased on few parcels of property). 
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Rather than impose new procedural steps, planning requirements, or the uncer-
tainty of a potential appeal, states would be better served by directly displacing 
specific elements of local zoning, as more recent interventions have increas-
ingly done. These interventions have not ignored local concerns, rather they 
have specified the types of concerns local governments can continue to ad-
dress, and in some instances have required local governments to substantiate 
those concerns. The proposed amendments to California’s ADU law vividly 
illustrate this, imposing a presumption in favor of detached ADUs, allowing 
local jurisdictions to exclude them from certain areas for specified reasons, but 
limiting those reasons to traditional zoning concerns of health and safety.371 
Interventions that displace, rather than simply channel, local land use de-
cision-making can, perhaps paradoxically, better serve to vindicate valid local 
interests. Although these interventions limit the discretion and range of options 
afforded local governments, they do so through legislative action setting clear-
ly defined parameters for local zoning and acceptable deviations from state 
regulation, rather than leaving local decisions subject to an uncertain adminis-
trative appeal process or a vague standard. Of course, the extent to which this 
occurs depends upon how and to what extent the relevant state law permits 
local deviation and what it identifies as a valid local interest that justifies such 
deviation. Ideally the state’s legislative process will consider local concerns 
and local differences even as it focuses primarily on addressing matters of 
state-wide concern.372 
CONCLUSION 
Amid housing shortages, surging prices, and increasing public recognition 
of the broader importance of zoning, state governments are intervening in local 
land use regulation in new ways. This Article provides a detailed analysis of 
the most significant recent interventions. It reveals that, in contrast with prior 
state efforts to push local communities to allow more housing development, 
the new state zoning is trending towards expressly preempting and displacing 
specific elements of local zoning. A variety of factors—including the salience 
of housing affordability for a broader swath of the population, a changing dis-
course regarding the economic and environmental benefits of dense develop-
ment, and an increasing willingness of state governments to preempt local reg-
ulation generally—suggest that these state interventions will have more signif-
icant effects than their predecessors. 
                                                                                                                           
 371 See supra notes 243–249 and accompanying text. 
 372 In the case of state interventions that provide incentives for local land use reform, concerns 
regarding adequate representation of local interests are less salient. Of course, the effectiveness of 
such laws in achieving the state’s goals significantly depends upon the strength of the incentives of-
fered for adopting them. 
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These recent interventions are justified by the extent of the current hous-
ing crisis; the broader effects of local zoning on housing supply, affordability, 
and other pressing state-wide concerns; and the exclusionary tendencies of lo-
cal governments. By targeting and expressly preempting specific local laws 
that stymie more and denser development, rather than imposing new procedur-
al and planning requirements, these interventions are less likely to be thwarted 
by local resistance. Simultaneously, by setting clear parameters for permissible 
local regulation, these measures are more likely to calibrate the balance of state 
and local power in a way that addresses both state-wide interests and signifi-
cant countervailing local concerns. 
  
 
